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Abstract 
The aim of this paper is to offer detailed information of fiscal redistribution in 36 countries, employing 
data that have been computed from the Luxembourg Income Study’s micro-level database. LIS data 
are detailed enough to allow us to measure both overall redistribution, and the partial effects of 
redistribution by several taxes or transfers. We elaborate on the work of Jesuit and Mahler (2004) and 
Mahler and Jesuit (2006), and we refine, update and extent their Fiscal Redistribution approach. LIS 
data allow us to decompose the trajectory of the Gini coefficient from primary to disposable income 
inequality in several parts: we will distinguish 11 different benefits and several income taxes and social 
contributions in our empirical investigation across countries. 
First, we use LIS data to analyze income inequality and the redistributive effect of social transfers 
across countries in a descriptive way. Then we proceed with a simulation approach for 36 countries for 
which we decompose income inequality through several taxes and transfers. We analyze the 
redistributive effect of several social programs, like unemployment benefits or pensions and income 
taxes. We develop a budget incidence simulation model to investigate to what extent several social 
transfers contribute to the overall redistribution in modern welfare states under a strong assumption 
that the absence of social transfers and taxes would not change individual behavior and labor supply.  
Among all countries listed in this paper, Denmark and Sweden have the smallest income disparity, 
while Peru and Colombia have the largest. Nordic countries show the most equally distributed 
disposable incomes and primary incomes, comparing to the countries in other types of welfare states. 
On average, large primary income disparity exists in Anglo-Saxon countries. Generally speaking, 
European countries achieve lower levels of income inequality than other countries.  
With respect to the redistributive effect, our budget incidence analysis indicates that the pattern is 
diverse across countries. The largest redistribution is found for Belgium, while Colombia and Peru show 
rather limited overall redistributive effects. On average, transfers reduce income inequality by over 85 
percent, while taxes account for only 15 percent of total redistribution. Among all welfare states, 
Continental European countries (Belgium, France, Germany, and Luxembourg) achieve the highest 
level of the reduction of initial income inequality. 
As far as social programs is concerned, in most countries two dominant income components account 
for above 50 percent of total reduction in income inequality: the public old age pensions and the 
survivors scheme, and the income taxes. For example, in Southern European Countries the public old 
age benefits account for over 80 percent of total redistribution, while these figures are much lower for 
Anglo-Saxon Countries (20-34%), for Nordic Countries (31-48%), for Continental European Countries 
(47-57%), and for Central Eastern European Countries (54-70%). In Anglo-Saxon Countries income 
taxes play a major role (above 30%) compare to other countries (with the exception the United 
kingdom). Also the redistributive effect of social assistance and child and family benefits in the Anglo-
Saxon Countries are relatively high in a comparative setting (9-28%). In Nordic Countries also a 
variety of other social programs contribute to the reduction of inequality, especially the disability 
scheme (9-15%). Remarkably, across countries all other social benefit programs seem to have rather 
limited redistributive effects, although the unemployment compensation benefits do have some effect 
too. 
 
Key words: welfare states, social income transfers, inequality, Gini coefficient, LIS 
JEL-codes: H53, H55, and I32 
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1. Introduction 
 
The growing interest in national and cross-national differences in earnings and income inequality 
has produced a wide range of studies (see Gottschalk et al, 1997; Brandolini and Smeeding, 2007; 
OECD, 2008; and Lambert et al, 2010). For many countries, studies are showing how income 
inequality has changed during recent years. An important development has been the launching of 
the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) in which microdatasets from various countries have been 
"harmonised". Consequently it is possible to study income inequality across countries (see 
Atkinson et al, 1995). However, the improvement in methods of measurement and in empirical 
knowledge is in contrast with the lack of insight into causes of changes in equality over time.1 
This should perhaps not come as a surprise as the distribution of income in a country is the 
outcome of numerous decisions made over time by households, firms, organizations and the 
public sector. One could think of an almost infinite number of micro-level causes for differences 
and changes in income inequality (Gottschalk and Smeeding, 2000). 
In this paper, we focus on the effect of taxes and transfers in redistributing income. Our 
expectation is that social transfers are mainly directed to lower income groups, while income 
taxes are mainly paid by the rich, and therefore both will have an impact on income 
(re)distribution. We use the traditional budget incidence approach—despite some methodological 
problems we will address— to study the combined effects of all taxes and transfers on the income 
(re)distribution. The distribution of primary or wage and salary income is compared with the 
distribution of income after tax and after social transfers. 
We present empirical results by analysing absolute levels of income inequality across countries for 
the most recent data year available (around 2004). Many factors make it difficult to compare the 
redistributive effect of taxes and transfers across countries (differences in income concepts, the 
income units, (summary) measures, equivalence adjustments and other factors). Moreover, there 
are numerous possible ways to analyse the impact of taxes and transfers on the distribution of 
income; some of these approaches are listed in our references.2 It is generally agreed upon that 
there is no single 'correct' methodology. However, the budget incidence approach is - still - a 
standard methodology for studying the combined effects of all taxes and transfers on the magnitude 
of (re)distributing income.  
The increasing income inequality observed for most—but not all—Western economies over the 
last decades has coincided with many structural changes in the economic system. For many 
countries the main forces behind growing disposable income inequality are the growth of 
inequality of earned market income, demographic changes, changes in household size and 
composition, and other endogenous factors. Atkinson (2000:17) concludes that we should not 
expect the same development in all countries, because the distribution of income is subject to a 
wide variety of forces (which may differ over countries). The evolution of income inequality is not 
simply the product of common economic forces: it also represents the impact of institutions and 
national policies. We focus on the redistributive effect of taxes and transfers to that end. 
 
                                                 
1  OECD (2008) summarizes trends and driving factors in income distribution and poverty on the basis of a 
harmonized questionnaire of OECD Member Countries (i.e., distribution indicators derived from national 
micro-economic data). 
2  Among others, see Atkinson et al (2000), Gustafson and Johanson (1997), Lambert et (2010), Moene and 
Wallerstein (2003), Swabish et al (2006). 
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Our contribution to the literature is threefold.  
First, we provide evidence on the redistributive effect of welfare state regimes by taxes and 
transfers across countries. Empirical data on the redistribution of income across countries is rare. 
Researchers conducting cross-national studies of the welfare state have until very recently been 
forced to rely on such proxies as the share of social benefits in gross domestic product. Even 
fewer cross-national studies have examined the redistributive role of taxes and transfers. The 
lack of cross-national data for so central a variable as state redistribution has been changed 
recently by the work of Mahler and Jesuit (2006) and Jesuit and Mahler (2010). We elaborate on 
and update the work of Jesuit and Mahler.  
Secondly, we confront results obtained by OECD (2008) with the results of the LIS database on 
the redistributive effect of social transfers across countries. The Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) 
offers micro-data on public and private sources of income that are comparable, detailed and 
accurate. Specifically, the LIS offers data on a large number of individual sources of income from 
both the private and public sectors. Moreover, the LIS data permit researchers to adjust for taxes 
and social insurance contributions assessed on income recipients. Using the LIS data set, it is 
possible to estimate direct redistribution for most developed countries. The intention of this paper 
is to offer an empirical analysis of state redistribution in 36 countries, with reference to micro-
data on household income available from the Luxembourg Income Study. Our aim is to offer data 
on income redistribution that are more accurate, comparable, detailed and recent than those that 
have been used in past work.  
Finally, we refine the method of Jesuit and Mahler. We undertake a more detailed study 
containing a simulation approach using LIS micro data which allow us to decompose income 
inequality through several taxes and social transfers. We develop a budget incidence simulation 
model to investigate to what extent several social transfers and taxes reduce income inequality in 
36 countries, under a strong assumption that the absence of social transfers and taxes would not 
change individual behavior and labor supply (Frick et al., 2000; Palme, 1996). With respect to the 
inequality index, we use the Gini coefficient, and decompose the Gini in a comparative setting. 
We apply the most straightforward—and most common—way of measuring government 
redistribution, simply by comparing the income households report that they receive from private-
sector sources with the income they receive after government transfers have been added and 
taxes and social insurance contributions deducted. The change in summary measures of 
inequality between pre- and post-government income represents direct government 
redistribution. For example, the mean of pre-government Gini indices of income inequality of the 
36 countries in this study around 2004 was 0.47. After adding government transfers and 
deducting income taxes and social insurance contributions the Gini fell to 0.33, representing a 
Gini reduction of 14 points or 30 percent. 
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we summarize literature on the redistributive 
effect of taxes and transfers in LIS countries. Section 3 presents our research method. Section 4 
provides a descriptive analysis of inequality and redistribution across 36 countries. Section 5 
presents the empirical results of our detailed decomposition of the redistributive effect of social 
transfers and taxes across countries. Section 6 provides a research agenda and section 7 
concludes the paper. 
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2. Income inequality and the redistributive effects of taxes and transfers across 
countries 
 
The relationship between income inequality and redistribution in a cross-country perspective is 
not crystal clear (see on this Lambert et al, 2010). A large number of articles discuss the 
relationship between income inequality and redistribution among countries. Despite recent 
empirical evidence suggesting that there is more redistribution when pre-tax income inequality is 
high, it is claimed by others that societies with low pre-tax income inequality redistribute more 
than less equal societies. The main reason for the confusion stems from differences in 
measurement strategies. Indeed, with three distributions involved (pre-tax-transfer income, 
post-tax-transfer income, and the tax burden), and as there exist different inequality measures 
to sum up these distributions, not surprisingly the literature offers a plethora of research 
methods and empirical results. Below we shall briefly review the main ones, restricting us to Gini-
based literature and applications, which are by far the most prevalent. 
Vast literature analyze income distribution across countries, indicating that the role of social 
policy (taxes and transfers) is important in the magnitude of redistributing income.3 Korpi and 
Palme (1998) used data from LIS to study different types of welfare states. They illustrated that 
both the level of transfers and the targeting to the poor are important for reducing income 
inequality. Bradley et al (2003) divide the welfare states into three categories (Social Democratic, 
Christian Democratic and Liberal Democratic) to study government redistribution and distributive 
profiles of taxes and transfers. Their results indicate that welfare generosity does not have a 
significant effect on pre-tax and pre-transfer income inequality, but does have a positive impact 
on the total redistribution of incomes. By using LIS data for the mid-2000s, Pressman (2009) 
finds a larger proportion of middle-class households in countries with rather progressive national 
tax systems and relative generous government spending programs. With respect to the 
relationship between inequality and redistribution, the results are not always in line with each 
other. Kenworthy and Pontusson (2005) examined the trend in market income inequality and 
redistribution in OECD countries in the 1980s and 1990s, indicating that redistribution increased 
in most countries. However, welfare state policies compensated for this rise in market inequality 
across countries. With respect to income mobility, Morillas (2009) finds that market income 
inequality is negatively associated with the level of the redistributive effect of taxes and transfers 
across countries. Goudswaard and Caminada (2010) and Caminada and Goudswaard (2005) 
studied the redistribution of public versus private social programs which have opposite 
distributional effects. 
The case for aggregate incidence studies was set down by Dalton (1936). From the studies in which 
this methodology has been implemented since research was initiated by Gillespie (1965). Of course, 
also critical literature on budget incidence analyses has emerged – but these criticisms leave the 
stylised conclusions intact; see a critical survey of efforts to measure budget incidence by Smolensky 
et al (1987). For example, the important issue of tax/transfer shifting is totally ignored in analyses 
on budget incidence in such a classical framework. However, models that include all behavioural 
links are beyond the scope of existing empirical work (Gottschalk and Smeeding, 1998:3). 
Therefore, researchers have restricted themselves largely to accounting exercises which 
                                                 
3  Among others, Brandolini and Smeeding (2007a and 2007b), Atkinson and Brandolini (2001), Smeeding 
(2000, 2004 and 2008), Gottschalk and Smeeding (1997, 1998 and 2000), Atkinson (2003), Ervik (1998), 
O’Higins et al (1990), and Brady (2004). 
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decompose changes in overall inequality into a set of components (see on this Kristjánsson, 
2011; Fuest et al, 2010; Paul, 2004). Despite the problem of tax shifting, analyses on statutory 
and budget incidence can be found for decades in literature on public finance.4  
Most studies focus on overall redistribution; others have examined in more detail the 
redistributive effect of several social programs. For example, Plotnick (1984) calculates the 
redistributive impact of cash transfers in the US in 1967 and in 1974. Caminada and Goudswaard 
(2001 and 2002) performed a budget incidence analysis for the Netherlands to investigate the 
effect of transfers and taxes in 1981, 1991 and 1997. Ferraini and Nelson (2003) focus on the 
effects of taxation of social insurance in 10 countries around 1995, analyzing inter- and intra- 
country comparisons of income (re)distribution. Mahler and Jesuit (2006) divide government 
redistribution into several components: the redistributive effects from unemployment benefits, 
from pensions, and from taxes. They applied their empirical exercise for 13 countries with LIS-
data around the years 1999/2000. We update and extent the analyses of Jesuit and Mahler by 
taking into account many more benefits and taxes, and we will apply a budget incidence analysis 
to a wider range of 36 countries with the most recent LIS data available (around 2004).  
 
 
3. Research method 
 
3.1 Measuring the redistributive effects of taxes and social transfers 
Usually, the impact of social policy on income inequality is calculated in line with the work of 
Musgrave, Case and Leonard (1974), i.e. statutory or budget incidence analysis. A standard 
analysis of the redistributive effect of taxes and income transfers is to compare pre-tax-transfer 
income inequality and post-tax-transfer income inequality (OECD 2008: 98). Our measure of the 
redistributive impact of social security on inequality is straightforwardly based on formulas 
developed by Kakwani (1986) and Ringen (1991): 
 
Redistribution by taxes and social transfers = primary income inequality − disposable income inequality 
 
This formula is used to estimate the reduction in inequality produced by taxes and social 
transfers, where primary income inequality is given by a summary statistic of pre-tax, pre-
transfer incomes and disposable income inequality is given by the same summary statistic of 
disposable equivalent incomes; see section 3.2 for more details. When calculating inequality 
indices for both primary and disposable income, people are ranked by their disposable incomes, 
so that the re-ranking effect is eliminated. Table 1 presents the framework of accounting income 
inequality and redistribution through various income sources; see Annex 1 for details on the LIS 
Household Income Components List. 
 
                                                 
4  See for example Dalton (1936), Musgrave and Tun Thin (1948), Gillespie (1965), Kakwani (1977a), 
Reynolds and Smolenskey (1977a and 1977b), Kiefer (1984), Mitchell (1991), Silber (1994), OECD (2008) 
and analyses based on the Luxembourg Income Study database (some of them are listed in our references). 
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Table 1 The income inequality and redistribution accounting framework 
 
Income components Income inequality and redistributive effect 
Gross wages and salaries + Self-employment income + cash 
property income + Occupational and private pensions + 
Private transfers + Other cash income = 
Primary income 
Income inequality before social 
transfers and taxes 
+ Social security cash benefits -/- Redistributive effect of social transfers 
= Gross income = Income inequality before taxes 
-/- Pay Roll (Mandatory payroll taxes) 
-/- Income taxes 
-/- Redistributive effect of taxes 
= Disposable income 
= Income inequality after social 
transfers and taxes 
 
Note: For France, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Mexico, Peru, Russia, Spain and Uruguay, the value of market income in 
the dataset is zero. Instead, we use net market income which is the sum of net wages and salaries, self-
employment income and cash property income. 
  
 
The measures of both pre- and post-social security income are far from ideal. At a conceptual 
level, no conceivable measure of pre-social security income could indicate what the income 
distribution would look like if social security did not exist. A comparison between the standard 
Gini index of post-tax-transfer income inequality and the hypothetical situation where social 
transfers are absent, other things being equal, shows that such transfers have an important 
redistributive effect that helps to reduce the number of people who are at risk of poverty.5 In the 
absence of all social transfers, the average poverty risk would be considerably higher than it is in 
reality. It should however be noted that the indicator of income inequality before social transfers 
must be interpreted with caution (Kim, 2000b; Nell, 2005). First, it is not taken into account that 
measures, like social cash transfers, can have the effect of raising the disposable incomes of 
households and individuals, namely transfers in kind, tax credits and tax allowances. Second, the 
pre-transfer inequality is compared to the post-transfer inequality keeping all other things equal 
– namely, assuming unchanged household and labor market structures, thus disregarding any 
possible behavioral changes that the situation of absence of social transfers would involve. 
However, behavioral responses – with the strongest effects on reducing work effort - have been 
at the heart of the policy debates shaping the evolution of antipoverty policy.6 Kim (2000b) 
showed that both the generosity and efficiency of the tax/transfer system may influence the level 
of pre-tax-transfer income inequality. Budget incidence calculations can only be seen as an 
approximation of the redistributive effects because the assumption that agents behave similar in 
situations with and without social transfers and social security. One may imagine the labor supply 
decision in absence of social transfers and social security. It is likely that in the absence of social 
transfers more people will work (more) thereby earning higher incomes and having consequences 
for income inequality. In essence, budget incidence analyses assume that labor supply decisions 
                                                 
5  Among others, see Behrendt (2002), Smeeding (2005), Förster (2000), Förster and Pearson (2002) and 
Förster and Mira d’Ercole (2005). 
6  We refer to a seminal review by Danziger, Haveman and Plotnick (1981). 
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in a situation with social transfers and social security are equal to a situation without social 
transfers. So, this standard approach biases the redistributive effect of generous and/or targeted 
welfare systems. Our estimates for redistribution through taxes and transfers of each country 
should consequently be regarded as upper bounds.  
 
3.2 Sequential decomposition of the Gini coefficient: partial effects of taxes and transfers 
The Gini coefficient is expressed as follows (cf. Jenkins, 1999; updated 2010): 



n
i
iyinnn
1
2 )1(]/2[)/1(1G  ， ni ,,2,1     (1) 
In formula (1), n denotes number of individuals, denotes average income of individuals, and iy  
presents income of individual. The level of Gini coefficient is given by number of individuals, 
average income of individuals. Using expression (1), we are able to decompose the Gini 
coefficient of primary income into the Gini coefficient of disposable income and the redistributive 
effects of transfers and taxes. Income (inequality) can be measured with or without transfers 
and/or taxes. 
ii
pri
ii TByy   ， ni ,,2,1  ， }1,0{,     (2) 
pri
iy , iB  and iT  denote primary income of individual i , total transfer of individual i  and total 
taxes of individual i , respectively. Depending on α and β, Individual income is determined by the 
sum of all cash incomes, such as wages, salaries, welfare benefits, public and private pensions, 
child and family allowances and so on, where we focus on social transfers and direct taxes. When 
α = 0 and β = 0, the resulting inequality measure presents the Gini coefficient before taxes and 
transfers; if α = 1 and β = 1, the measure corresponds to the Gini coefficient after taxes and 
transfers; if α = 0 and β = 1 the measure shows the Gini coefficient after taxes but before 
transfers, which displays a world without social transfers. For α = 1 and β = 0, inequality after 
transfers, but before taxes is measured.  
 
In a more general expression, individual income can be shown as formula (3), consisting of 
primary income, at most m kinds of transfers and p types of taxes. Bik show the k
th transfer of 
individual i, and Til presents the lth tax of individual i. When αk =1, α-k = 0 (αj = 0 (j≠k)) and βl = 
0, individual income includes primary income plus the kth transfer; when αk =1, βl = 1 and β-l = 0 
(βq = 0 (q≠l)), individual income contains primary income plus all the transfers and the lth tax, we 
explain why we choose this order later in section 3.3. 
 
 

m
k
p
l
illikk
pri
ii TByy
1 1
 ， ni ,,2,1  ， mk ,,2,1  ， pl ,,2,1  ， }1,0{, lk   (3) 
This allows us to calculate inequality (Gini) without a certain kind of transfers or tax, and 
consequently the partial redistributive effect of that transfer or tax. Likewise the redistributive 
effects of all income components within the trajectory between primary income inequality and 
disposable income inequality (like unemployment benefits, old age pension benefits, disability 
benefits, social assistance, income taxes, mandatory social contributions) can be calculated based 
on this formula.  
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We take a budget incidence approach to measure the redistributive effect of the welfare state, 
and we focus on the redistribution between individuals or households at one moment in time (not 
over the lifecycle). We apply the Reynolds-Smolensky (1977a and 1977b) measure of the 
redistributive impact of taxes and transfers to present the reduction in Gini coefficient from 
primary income (pri) to disposable income (dpi). The redistributive effect L can be expressed as 
(c.f. Creedy and Ven, 2001): 
dpipri GG L    (4) 
L and G are the redistributive effect and the Gini coefficient of primary or disposable income. 
When moving from the pre-tax-transfer to the post-tax-transfer distribution, the re-ranking 
effect, R, is taken into account (Atkinson, 1979 and Plotnick, 1981). 
dpidpi CGR     (5) 
Where dpiC denotes the concentration coefficient. However, when income level is ranked by 
primary income rather than by disposable income, the re-ranking effect will be absent ( 0R ). 
The total redistributive effect can be disentangled in several partial effects:  
Bpripri GG BL    (6) 
dpiBpri GG  TL            (7) 
LB and LT represent the partial redistributive effect of all benefit transfers B, and the partial 
redistributive effect of all taxes and social contributions T. Consequently, the decomposition in 
formula (6) and (7) will offer us a quantitative measure for the reduction in the Gini by social 
programs in a country. 
In order to assess the effects of taxes and benefits on the overall redistribution we apply a 
sequential decomposition technique. This division is somewhat arbitrary since the choice of 
benchmark income affects the outcome. Applying the redistribution from, say, taxes on gross 
income rather than market income alters the outcome to some extent. Since taxes are levied on 
gross income (market income plus benefits), the redistributional effects may be underestimated. 
Nevertheless the logic of this decomposition of Gini is that taxes are applied to gross income and 
benefits to market income. This approach has been, among others, advocated by Kakwani (1986). 
 
Our sequential decomposition approach of income inequality follows studies by Mahler and Jesuit 
(2004) and Mahler and Jesuit (2006), with inequality indices accounted sequentially in order to 
determine the effective distributional impact of different income sources. Other techniques of the 
decomposition of the Gini coefficient by income source can be found in the literature as well; see 
e.g. Lerman and Yitzhaki (1985), Stark et al (1986), Kim (2000a), Creedy and Ven (2001). For 
example the well-known Lerman and Yitzhaki’s method derives the marginal impact of various 
income sources on overall income inequality.7 Fuest et al (2010) explore the redistributive effects 
of different tax benefit instruments in the enlarged European Union (EU) based on two families of 
approaches. When comparing both approaches, they lead to the same estimates of disposable 
income inequality, however, both lead to somewhat contradictory results with respect to the 
importance of benefits for redistributing income. Inequality analysis based on the sequential 
accounting decomposition approach suggests that benefits are the most important factor 
                                                 
7  See for ‘descogini’ in STATA (Lopez-Feldman, 2006).  
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reducing inequality in the majority of countries (e.g. Immervoll et al, 2005; Mahler and Jesuit, 
2006; Whiteford, 2008). The factor source decomposition approach, suggested by Shorrocks 
(1982), however, suggests that benefits play a negligible role and sometimes even contribute 
slightly positively to inequality (e.g., Jenkins 1995; Jäntti 1997; Burniaux et al. 1998). On the 
contrary, here taxes and social contributions are by far the most important contributors to 
income inequality reduction. Fuest et al (2010) explain these partly contradictory results. The 
most important difference between the two approaches is that the accounting approach applies 
tax benefit instruments sequentially, whereas, the decomposition approach accounts for them 
simultaneously. 
Although both approaches are used in the literature, studies analyzing the impact of tax benefit 
instruments based on the standard sequential accounting approach generally find rather 
intuitively straight forward results, i.e. that benefits are the most important source of inequality 
reduction in European countries. In order to assess the effects of taxes and benefits on the 
overall redistribution we (therefore) apply the sequential decomposition technique in line with the 
comparative work of Mahler and Jesuit (2006), and recent studies by Kristjánsson (2011) and 
Kammer and Niehues (2011). This choice for an sequential approach is somewhat arbitrary, but 
fits in a strand of empirical literature that systematically illustrate that social transfers 
significantly improve the economic conditions of families, especially in European countries, and 
that the distribution of disposable incomes in these societies become more equal with the 
existence of these types of provisions.  
 
3.3 Sequential decomposition of the Gini coefficient: partial effects of different income sources 
In order to disentangle the inequality even further by income source, the redistributive effect of 
several benefit transfers and taxes can be represented by formula (8) and (9):  
dpipri GG L    (4) 
kBpripriBk
GG L            (8) 
lTBpriBpriTl
GG  L            (9) 
L, LBk and LTI represent the overall redistributive effect, the partial redistributive effect of a 
specific kind of transfer Bk, and the partial redistributive effect of an income tax Tl. Consequently, 
the decomposition in formula (8), and (9) will offer us an quantitative measure for the reduction 
in the Gini by social programs in a country. 
It should be noted that the results to be obtained could be affected by the ordering effect, but we 
will correct for this. For example, the partial redistributive effect of a specific social transfer will 
be highest (smallest) when computed as the first (last) social program; see equation 3. The 
partial effects of these transfers in total redistribution could be computed in several orders. We 
consider every specific social transfer as the first program to be added to primary income 
distribution, and every direct tax as the first tax to be subtracted from gross income. In that 
case, the sum of all partial redistributive effects amount (a little) over 100 percent. We rescaled 
the redistributive effects of each program by applying an adjustment factor, which is defined as 
the overall redistribution given by formula (4) (= 100%) divided by sum of all partial 
redistributive effects of all programs (over 100%), in order to correct for an over-estimated 
effect.  
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3.4 Choice of income unit 
The unit of analysis is an important issue in income distribution studies. It is evident that the 
ultimate source of concern is the welfare of the individual. However, an individual is often not the 
appropriate unit of analysis. E.g. children and spouses working at home do not have recorded 
income, but may nevertheless be enjoying a high standard of living as a result of income sharing 
with parents/spouses. How to solve the problem of the key question of the unit of analysis? 
Traditionally, studies have used the household income per capita (or per member) measure to 
adjust total incomes according to the number of persons in the household. The last decades, 
equivalence scales have been widely used in the literature on income distribution (see Figini, 1998). 
An equivalence scale is a function that calculates adjusted income from income and a vector of 
household characteristics. The general form of these equivalence scales is given by the following 
expression: 
ES
DW  , where W is adjusted income, D is income (disposable income), S is size 
(number of persons in households) and E is equivalence elasticity. E varies between 0 and 1. The 
larger E, the smaller are the economies of scale assumed by the equivalence scales. Equivalence 
scales range from E=0 (no adjustment or full economics of scale) to E=1 (zero economies of scale). 
Between these extremes, the range of values used in different studies is very large, strongly 
affecting measured inequality.  
Equivalence scale elasticity for the LIS database is set around 0.5. This implies that in order to have 
an equivalent income of a household of one person where D is 100, a household of two persons 
must have an income of 140 to have equivalent incomes. Alternatively an one-person household 
must have 70 percent of the total income of a two-person household to have equivalent income. In 
our comparative analysis we use this equivalence scale of LIS, where E is around 0.5. However, it 
has been shown that the choice of equivalence scales affects international comparisons of income 
inequality to a wide extend. Alternatively adjustment methods would definitely affect the ranking of 
countries, although the broad pattern remains the same (Atkinson et al, 1995:52). 
 
3.5 Countries and other measurement issues 
In empirical literature, the selection of countries and data-years differ due to the consideration of 
data quality. We apply a cross-national analysis using comparable income surveys for all 
countries of LIS around 2004. LIS micro data seems to be the best available data for describing 
how income inequality and the redistributive effects of taxes and transfers vary across countries 
(Nolan and Marx, 2009; Smeeding, 2008). LIS data contains information for 36 countries for one 
or more than one year of data (from wave I to wave VI), allowing researchers to make 
comparisons in a straightforward manner, and the information is still updating and expanding. 
This paper uses the data of all countries in LIS. In this paper we restrict ourselves to the latest 
data year available (around 2004) to analyze redistribution of social transfers and taxes. 
Countries included in LIS come from Europe, North America, the Far East and Australia: 
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Hungary, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Korea, Luxembourg, 
Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, Peru, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Uruguay.8 
                                                 
8  It should be noted that Taiwan is regarded as a district of China, while in this comparative study we 
simply refer to Taiwan (as coded by LIS). 
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From nearly 300 variables in the dataset, we choose those related to household income (all kinds 
of income sources), total number of persons in a household and household weight (in order to 
correct sample bias or non-sampling errors) to measure income inequality and the redistributive 
effect across countries. In line with LIS convention and the work of Mahler and Jesuit (2006), we 
have eliminated both observations with zero or a missing value of disposable income from LIS 
data. Household weights are applied for calculation of Gini coefficients.  
It should be noted that there have been controversial arguments regarding the issues in the 
measurement of income inequality. These arguments have their own merits and shortcomings, 
and there has been little professional consensus among researchers with regard to the theoretical 
superiority of a particular way of measuring inequality. Moreover, the availability of reliable data 
restricts the possibilities for conducting empirical research, which is especially problematic in 
cross-national studies. The aim of this paper is not to review definitional issues that arise in 
assessing the extent of, and change in, income inequality in Western industrialized countries. We 
simply refer to a vast literature on the sensitivity of measured results to the choice of income 
definitions, inequality indices, appropriate equivalence scales, and other elements that may affect 
results in comparative research.9  
 
 
4. Inequality and redistribution across LIS countries: A descriptive analysis 
 
4.1 Inequality across countries 
This section reviews the evidence on cross national comparisons of annual disposable income 
inequality over 36 nations. This section is mainly descriptive and relies on the empirical evidence 
LIS and from OECD (2008) for the levels of income inequality around the mid 2000s. Levels of 
inequality can be shown in several ways, e.g., by Lorenz curves, specific points on the percentile 
distribution (P10 or P90), decile ratios (P90—P10), and Gini coefficients or many other summary 
statistics of inequality. All (summary) statistics of inequality can be used to rank income 
inequality in LIS countries, but they do not always tell the same story. 
Figure 1 shows the Gini coefficient. Countries are listed in order of their Gini of disposable income 
from smallest to largest. The obvious advantage of the presentation of inequality by summary 
statistics like the Gini coefficient is its ability to summarize several nations in one picture. 
 
                                                 
9  Among others, see Atkinson (1970, 1979, 1987 and 2003), Champernowne (1974), Kakwani (1977b), 
Hagenaars and De Vos (1987), Coulter (1989), Atkinson et al (1995), Behrendt (2000), Gottschalk and 
Smeeding (1997 and 2000), Marcus and Danziger (2000), Atkinson and Brandolini (2001 and 2006), 
Caminada and Goudswaard (2001 and 2002), Förster and Pearson (2002), Smeeding (2005 and 2008), 
Förster and Mira d’Ercole (2005), OECD (2008) and (other) papers listed in our reference section using 
data from the Luxembourg Income Study. Recent comprehensive reviews on methodological assumptions 
underlying international levels and trends in inequality are found in Brandolini and Smeeding (2007 and 
2008).  
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Figure 1 Disposable and primary income inequality across LIS countries around 2004 
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Source: own calculations based on LIS 
 
 
The lowest income inequality is found in the Nordic countries, while Uruguay, Russia, Mexico, 
Guatemala, Peru and Columbia are the most unequal nations. Figure 1 indicates that a wide 
range of inequality exists across 36 LIS nations, with the nation with the highest inequality 
coefficient (Columbia) over twice as high as the nation with the lowest coefficient (Denmark). 
With respect to income inequality after social transfers and taxes, there are 24 countries with the 
Gini coefficient below average (0.33). Denmark, Sweden, Slovak Republic and Slovenia have 
rather low values around 0.24, in line with the results in OECD (2008), followed by other 12 
countries (Finland, Norway, Netherlands, Czech Republic, Switzerland, Luxembourg, Austria, 
Romania, Germany, Belgium, France and Hungary) with Gini coefficients between 0.25 and 0.30. 
Above average inequality is found in 12 countries (Italy, Estonia, the United Kingdom, Israel, the 
United States, Uruguay, Russia, Mexico, Brazil, Guatemala, Peru and Colombia). 
 
The pattern of primary income inequality (before social transfers and taxes) is quite different 
from disposable income inequality. Russia, Brazil, and Belgium have the highest level of primary 
income inequality, with values around 0.55. Taiwan, Korea, Romania and Switzerland have rather 
low levels of primary income inequality, below 0.40. The redistributive effect of taxes and social 
transfers differ considerably across countries. The highest level of redistribution is found in 
Belgium, Hungary and Finland, while redistribution is rather small in Peru and Colombia. This 
cross country difference in the redistributive effect will be analyzed in section 4.2. 
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4.2 The redistributive effect of taxes and transfers 
Several studies focused on the impact of income components on overall inequality (Shorrocks, 
1983; Lerman and Yitzhaki, 1985; Jenkins, 1995; Breen et al, 2008). These suggest that income 
taxes and social benefits are important sources of reducing household income inequality. Figure 2 
shows the overall redistribution across countries and the disaggregated effects of social transfers 
and taxes based on formula (6) and (7). On average, the share of social transfers play a major 
role of 85 percent in the total reduction of inequality, while taxes take account for 15 percent of 
total reduction of income inequality. According to LIS income surveys, income taxes and 
mandatory payroll taxes are involved in the redistribution of taxes, rather than indirect taxes. For 
some countries, such as Hungary, Italy, Mexico, Peru, Russia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia and 
Uruguay data of taxes are not available in the dataset.  
 
Figure 2 Redistributive effect of taxes and transfers across LIS countries around 2004 
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From Transfers From Taxes
 
Note: For Hungary, Italy, Mexico, Peru, Russia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia and Uruguay data for taxes are not 
available.  
 
Source: own calculations based on LIS 
 
Belgium, Hungary, Finland, Germany, Poland, Sweden and Czech Republic have high levels of 
total redistribution, while Korea, Taiwan, Mexico, Guatemala, Colombia and Peru have a rather 
small extent of overall redistribution. In view of total redistribution, Guatemala is one of the 
countries having a rather low level of total redistribution. However, this inequality reduction is 
mainly achieved by taxes. Besides Guatemala, only in a few countries taxes are important in 
equalizing incomes: the United States, Israel, and Canada. Generally speaking, redistribution of 
income in most countries relies to a large extent on social transfers. This relative effect of social 
transfers and taxes in total redistribution is presented in Figure 3 (countries are listed according 
to the reduction of income inequality by taxes).  
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Figure 3. Relative redistributive effect of taxes and transfers across countries around 2004 
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From Transfers From Taxes
 
Note: For Hungary, Italy, Mexico, Peru, Russia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia and Uruguay data for taxes are not 
available.  
 
Source: own calculations based on LIS 
 
Note that the partial effect of taxes is negative for Colombia and for Switzerland. The negative 
contribution for Switzerland is caused by tax competition (Kirchgässner and Pommerehne, 1996; 
Feld 1999). In this country it appears to be difficult to levy redistributive taxes from the rich and 
mobile persons to the poor. As a result the amount of taxes paid by rich people is relatively low. 
 
4.3 Redistribution, budget size and targeting 
Considering the redistributive effect of social benefits, scholars have distinct between programs’ 
size and the extent to which they are targeted toward low-income groups by means-testing. In a 
seminal paper by Korpi and Palme (1998: 663), they have posited a “paradox of redistribution” 
whereby “the more we target benefits to the poor . . . the less likely we are to reduce poverty 
and inequality.” The paradox arises from the fact that highly targeted programs have the support 
of a small and isolated political base. As they put it, targeted programs offer “no rational base for 
a coalition between those above and below the poverty line. In effect, the poverty line splits the 
working class and tends to generate coalitions between better-off workers and the middle class 
against the lower sections of the working class” (Korpi and Palme, 1998: 663). Comprehensive 
programs, on the other hand, even when they are organized according to social insurance 
principles, tend to encourage coalitions between the working and middle classes that leave low-
income groups less isolated. 
With this background in mind, it is useful to explore empirically these two aspects of transfers 
with reference to the LIS database. Is redistribution associated with transfers’ overall size or with 
their target efficiency? Is there, as is often suggested, a tradeoff between the two? Using LIS 
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micro data it is possible to calculate a measure of the average value of social transfers as a 
percentage of households’ pre-tax income: the larger the value, the greater the share of total 
income that derives from transfers. It is also possible to calculate a summary index of the degree 
to which transfers are targeted toward low-income groups. This is done by applying Kakwani’s 
(1986) ‘index of concentration’ to transfers. This index takes on the value of -1.0 if the poorest 
person gets all transfer income, 0 if everybody gets an equal amount, and +1.0 if the richest 
person gets all transfer income (cf. Korpi and Palme, 1998: 684). Figures for the size and target 
efficiency of social benefits are calculated for all 36 LIS countries are reported in Figure 4; see 
more details in Table 2.  
As is shown, there is indeed considerable variance among developed countries in the average size 
of social benefits relative to total household income, ranging from 3.1% to 35.7%. In rich LIS 
countries, Austria, Finland and France achieve the highest budget size of transfers (above 25%), 
followed by Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Spain and Sweden with 
values between 20% and 25%, while Belgium and the U.S. have the lowest level less than 10%. 
As for target efficiency, it is more diverse across countries. France and Italy have a rather high 
budget size of transfers with transfer programs slightly regressive. Finland, Germany, the 
Netherlands and Sweden have low target efficiency, but high social expenditures. Australia and 
the United Kingdom show high figures for transfer targeting although with a modest redistributive 
budget size (less than 15%). The United States is one of the countries with rather low social 
transfers, also with a quite low target efficiency. Interestingly, Canada, at the very bottom of our 
list of budget size, achieves a high target efficiency among rich countries.  
 
Figure 4. Redistribution, budget size and targeting across 36 LIS countries around 2004 
 
Panel (a) Panel (b) 
 
Source: own calculations based on LIS 
 
The budget size of transfers plays a very important role on overall redistribution, which is 
confirmed by a simple regression analysis in Figure 4 Panel (a). The estimated coefficient of the 
budget size is statistically significant. Further more, target efficiency is also strongly and 
negatively significant with total redistribution (see Panel (b)), which is in line with the claim of 
y = 0,006x + 0,032
R2 = 0,501
0,0
0,1
0,2
0,3
0 10 20 30 40
Budget size (%)
R
e
d
is
tr
ib
u
ti
o
n
 (
G
p
ri
 -
 G
d
p
i)
.
y = -0.170x + 0.145
R2 = 0.428
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
-1.0 -0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0
Efficiency (Concentration Index)
R
e
d
is
tr
ib
u
ti
o
n
 (
G
p
ri
 -
 G
d
p
i)
.
 17 
Korpi and Palme that greater use of transfer targeting yields less redistribution. However, it 
should be noted that our analysis is based on 36 LIS countries. When we restrict our analysis to 
the twenty wealthiest countries of LIS, both correlations disappear. Redistribution of incomes 
across countries does not correlate with both the budget size and the target efficiency. This little 
or no indication of a relationship between targeting and redistribution is in line with recent work 
of Kenworthy (2011: Chapter 6, page 2-4). 
 
Figure 5. Redistribution, budget size and targeting across 20 rich LIS countries around 2004 
 
Panel (a)  Panel (b) 
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Selected LIS countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, 
Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States. 
 
Source: own calculations based on LIS 
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Table 2 summarizes our results so far. 
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Table 2 Redistributive effect of social transfers and taxes around 2004 
 
 
Data 
year 
GINI 
(pri) 
GINI 
(dpi) 
Redistri- 
bution 
From 
transfers 
From  
Taxes 
Budget 
size (%) 
Efficiency 
/ targeting 
Australia 2003 0.461 0.312 0.149 0.101 0.047 11.1 -0.404 
Austria 2004 0.459 0.269 0.190 0.156 0.034 26.7 0.108 
Belgium 2000 0.542 0.279 0.263 0.201 0.063 7.9 -0.244 
Brazil 2006 0.570 0.486 0.084 0.070 0.014 21.2 0.443 
Canada 2004 0.433 0.318 0.114 0.076 0.038 10.9 -0.193 
Colombia 2004 0.514 0.508 0.006 0.006 -0.001 8.9 0.756 
Czech Republic 2004 0.468 0.267 0.201 0.163 0.038 20.8 -0.218 
Denmark 2004 0.419 0.228 0.191 0.149 0.042 18.9 -0.306 
Estonia 2004 0.493 0.340 0.153 0.120 0.034 17.9 -0.099 
Finland 2004 0.464 0.252 0.212 0.168 0.044 23.2 -0.127 
France 2005 0.449 0.281 0.168 0.151 0.017 26.2 0.077 
Germany 2004 0.489 0.278 0.210 0.158 0.052 21.2 -0.110 
Greece 2004 0.462 0.329 0.133 0.127 0.007 21.5 0.132 
Guatemala 2006 0.521 0.507 0.014 0.002 0.012 3.4 0.610 
Hungary 2005 0.533 0.289 0.244 0.244 0.000 35.7 0.016 
Ireland 2004 0.490 0.312 0.178 0.132 0.046 17.3 -0.205 
Israel  2005 0.491 0.370 0.121 0.076 0.045 11.0 -0.125 
Italy 2004 0.503 0.338 0.165 0.165 0.000 25.4 0.126 
Korea 2006 0.334 0.311 0.023 0.017 0.006 3.1 -0.032 
Luxembourg 2004 0.452 0.268 0.184 0.147 0.037 23.4 0.035 
Mexico 2004 0.476 0.458 0.018 0.018 0.000 6.0 0.386 
Netherlands 2004 0.459 0.263 0.196 0.156 0.040 21.3 -0.041 
Norway 2004 0.430 0.256 0.174 0.139 0.035 20.2 -0.155 
Peru 2004 0.512 0.507 0.005 0.005 0.000 6.7 0.634 
Poland 2004 0.527 0.320 0.207 0.202 0.005 32.5 0.157 
Romania 1997 0.372 0.277 0.095 0.082 0.013 15.4 -0.028 
Russia 2000 0.562 0.434 0.127 0.127 0.000 19.3 0.028 
Slovak Republic 1996 0.425 0.241 0.185 0.185 0.000 26.6 -0.109 
Slovenia 2004 0.416 0.242 0.174 0.174 0.000 27.5 0.011 
Spain 2004 0.441 0.315 0.126 0.124 0.001 20.7 0.068 
Sweden 2005 0.442 0.237 0.205 0.168 0.037 24.6 -0.128 
Switzerland 2004 0.395 0.268 0.128 0.130 -0.003 17.5 -0.066 
Taiwan 2005 0.324 0.305 0.019 0.016 0.003 5.9 0.092 
United Kingdom 2004 0.490 0.345 0.145 0.124 0.021 14.3 -0.313 
United States 2004 0.482 0.372 0.109 0.066 0.043 9.9 -0.060 
Uruguay 2004 0.542 0.428 0.114 0.114 0.000 25.7 0.350 
          
Mean 2003.6 0.468 0.328 0.140 0.118 0.021 18.0 0.043 
 
Source: own calculations based on LIS 
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4.5 Sensitivity analysis 
While even the LIS-data are by no means perfect, they produce some consistent patterns. The 
range of income inequality among LIS and OECD countries seems very wide at any point in time. 
Moreover, in spite of differences in the measurement of income inequality and the databases 
used, most studies have consistently found that there is a large difference in inequality among 
welfare states. Reports on inequality profiles for EU15 and other OECD countries for the latest 
data year available from OECD (2008) also consistently show – in general - Scandinavian and 
Benelux countries have the lowest income inequality, followed by continental European countries. 
Anglo Saxon welfare states have relatively higher inequality. Among them, the level of income 
inequality is high in the United States.  
Table 3 compares Gini coefficients (before and after social transfers and taxes) around 2004 from 
the OECD database with figures from LIS (2011), which are completely in line with our 
calaculations. From the 41 countries listed in Table 3, 20 countries are adopted in both the 
OECD-database and the LIS-database. Note that disposable income inequality data across 
countries of OECD-data and LIS-data are highly correlated (around 0.93). Correlation coefficients 
for primary income and for redistribution are somewhat lower (resp. 0.75 to 0.78). For most 
countries the difference in primary income inequality from OECD and from LIS do not exceed 3 
percentage points, with exceptions for Belgium, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Italy, The 
Netherlands, Poland, Slovak Republic and the United Kingdom. What could explain these 
differences? 
First and foremost, it is because the difference between income surveys. LIS micro data are 
predicated on different surveys across countries, for instance, Socio-Economic Panel (SEP) / NL 
ECHP (NL94, NL99, NL04) in the Netherlands, Current Population Survey (CPS) in United States, 
Survey of Income and Housing Costs (SIHC) in Australia. From those surveys, LIS staff refined 
and formalized rules used to classify variables, offering comparable micro dataset. Computations 
in OECD dataset are based on the OECD income distribution questionnaires. Therefore, the 
sample of surveys is not the same, leading to the different values of income inequality and the 
redistributive effect of taxes and transfers.  
Second, there are minor differences with regard to the methodology applied. The concept of 
disposable income is quasi-identical between both data sources (OECD, 2008: 153). However, 
the equivalence scale used by LIS differs slightly from the one used by the OECD, giving a 
somewhat higher weight to additional household members and distinguishing between adults and 
children. LIS equivalent scale equals to the square root of the number of persons in the 
household while OECD modified equivalent scale = 1 + 0.5*number of other adult members + 
0.3*number of children below 14 (OECD original equivalent scale = 1+0.7*number of other adult 
members + 0.5*number of child below 14).  
Third, it is because the definition of primary income, and the way income inequality before 
transfers and taxes is measured. Using LIS data, the degree of redistribution is calculated by 
comparing Gini coefficients on the basis of primary income and on the basis of gross income, in 
which primary income is considered as the sum of market income, private transfers and other 
cash income. With respect to pre-government income inequality using OECD data, it depends on 
market income. Consequently, the level of income disparity and overall redistributive effect 
differs when data is used from the LIS dataset and from the OECD dataset.  
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Table 3 OECD versus LIS: Income inequality and Redistribution across countries 
 
  
OECD-data around 2004 
 
LIS-data around 2004 
 
Country 
Data 
year 
GINI 
(pri) 
GINI 
(dpi) Redistribution 
Data  
year 
GINI 
(pri) 
GINI 
(dpi) Redistribution 
Australia 2004 0.458 0.301 0.157 2003 0.461 0.312 0.149 
Austria 2004 0.433 0.265 0.168 2004 0.459 0.269 0.190 
Belgium 2004 0.494 0.271 0.223 2000 0.542 0.279 0.263 
Brazil       2006 0.570 0.486 0.084 
Canada 2005 0.436 0.317 0.119 2004 0.433 0.318 0.114 
Colombia       2004 0.514 0.508 0.006 
Czech Republic 2004 0.474 0.268 0.206 2004 0.468 0.267 0.201 
Denmark 2004 0.417 0.232 0.184 2004 0.419 0.228 0.191 
Estonia       2004 0.493 0.340 0.153 
Finland 2004 0.386 0.269 0.117 2004 0.464 0.252 0.212 
France 2004 0.471 0.270 0.201 2005 0.449 0.281 0.168 
Germany 2004 0.507 0.298 0.209 2004 0.489 0.278 0.210 
Greece 2004  0.321   2004 0.462 0.329 0.133 
Guatemala       2006 0.521 0.507 0.014 
Hungary 2005  0.291   2005 0.533 0.289 0.244 
Iceland 2004 0.368 0.280 0.089     
Ireland 2004 0.416 0.328 0.088 2004 0.490 0.312 0.178 
Israel        2005 0.491 0.370 0.121 
Italy 2004 0.557 0.352 0.205 2004 0.503 0.338 0.165 
Japan 2000 0.443 0.321 0.123     
Korea 2005 0.339 0.312 0.026 2006 0.334 0.311 0.023 
Luxembourg 2004 0.454 0.258 0.196 2004 0.452 0.268 0.184 
Mexico 2004  0.474   2004 0.476 0.458 0.018 
Netherlands 2004 0.423 0.271 0.152 2004 0.459 0.263 0.196 
New Zealand 2003 0.473 0.335 0.138     
Norway 2004 0.433 0.276 0.157 2004 0.430 0.256 0.174 
Peru       2004 0.512 0.507 0.005 
Poland 2004 0.568 0.372 0.196 2004 0.527 0.320 0.207 
Portugal 2004  0.385       
Romania       1997 0.372 0.277 0.095 
Russia       2000 0.562 0.434 0.127 
Slovak Republic 2004 0.459 0.268 0.191 1996 0.425 0.241 0.185 
Slovenia       2004 0.416 0.242 0.174 
Spain 2004  0.319   2004 0.441 0.315 0.126 
Sweden 2004 0.432 0.234 0.198 2005 0.442 0.237 0.205 
Switzerland 2001  0.276   2004 0.395 0.268 0.128 
Taiwan       2005 0.324 0.305 0.019 
Turkey 2004  0.430       
United Kingdom 2005 0.460 0.335 0.125 2004 0.490 0.345 0.145 
United States 2005 0.457 0.381 0.076 2004 0.482 0.372 0.109 
Uruguay      2004 0.542 0.428 0.114 
           
Mean (20 common 
countries) 2004.2 0.454 0.294 0.160 2003.6 0.461 0.287 0.173 
 
Source: OECD (2008), LIS (2011) and own calculation. 
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Although the way of measuring income inequality differs to some extent in the LIS-dataset and 
the OECD-dataset, the general pictures from both datasets are almost the same. Table 4 ranks 
20 common countries in LIS-data and OECD-data from low to high for all data variables around 
2004. The smallest disposable income disparity exists in Denmark and Sweden, while the largest 
value is found for the United States, independent of the data source used. With respect to the 
reduction of income inequality by taxes and transfers, Belgium achieves the highest level, while 
Korea shows the lowest value, again independent of the data source used. Both data sets rank 
Korea on top the list for the lowest primary income inequality. The largest value for primary 
income inequality is found for Belgium according to LIS, while OECD-methodology points at 
Poland. 
To conclude: relatively high levels of primary income inequality are found for Belgium, Poland, 
and Italy, while low values are found for Korea, Denmark, and Finland. With respect to disposable 
income inequality, high indices are found for the United States, the United Kingdom, Poland and 
Italy, while low Gini coefficients are found for Denmark and Sweden. The redistributive effect of 
taxes and transfers is relatively high in Belgium and Germany, while the redistributive effect is 
rather low for Korea and the United States. 
 
Table 4 Ranking of common countries in LIS and OECD dataset 
 
GINI pri GINI dpi Redistribution 
 
LIS OECD LIS OECD LIS OECD 
1 Korea Korea Denmark Denmark Korea Korea 
2 Denmark Finland Sweden Sweden US US 
3 Slovak Republic  Ireland  Slovak Republic  Luxembourg Canada Ireland  
4 Norway Denmark Finland Austria UK Finland 
5 Canada Netherlands Norway Slovak Republic  Australia Canada 
6 Sweden Sweden Netherlands Czech Republic Italy UK 
7 France Austria Czech Republic Finland France Netherlands 
8 Luxembourg Norway Luxembourg France Norway Norway 
9 Netherlands Canada Austria Belgium Ireland  Australia 
10 Austria Luxembourg Germany Netherlands Luxembourg Austria 
11 Australia US Belgium Norway Slovak Republic  Denmark 
12 Finland Australia France Germany Austria Slovak Republic  
13 Czech Republic Slovak Republic  Korea Australia Denmark Poland 
14 US UK Ireland  Korea Netherlands Luxembourg 
15 Germany France Australia Canada Czech Republic Sweden 
16 Ireland  Czech Republic Canada Ireland  Sweden France 
17 UK Belgium Poland UK Poland Italy 
18 Italy Germany Italy Italy Germany Czech Republic 
19 Poland Italy UK Poland Finland Germany 
20 Belgium Poland US US Belgium Belgium 
 
Note: Ranking by the value of GINI (pri), GINI (dpi) and redistribution, respectively, from low to high. 
 
Source: LIS (2011), OECD (2008), and own calculations. 
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5.  Decomposition of the redistributive effect of social transfers and taxes across LIS 
countries around 2004: an empirical analysis 
 
This section provides detailed results of the redistributive effect of welfare state regimes across a 
selection of our 36 countries based on the most recent wave of LIS. We elaborate on the work of 
Jesuit and Mahler (2006). However, we refine their Fiscal Redistribution approach. LIS data allow 
us to decompose the trajectory of the Gini coefficient from primary to disposable income 
inequality in several parts: we will distinguish 11 different social benefits and several income 
taxes and social contributions in our empirical investigation across countries. We calculate the 
following (partial) redistributive effects, based on formula (8) and (9) and based on the LIS 
household income components list (see Annex 1 for more details): sickness benefits, occupational 
injury and disease benefits, disability benefits, state old-age and survivors benefits, child/family 
benefits, unemployment compensation benefits, maternity and other family leave benefits, 
military/veterans/war benefits, other social insurance benefits, social assistance cash benefits, 
near-cash benefits, mandatory payroll taxes and income taxes.  
Special attention needs the treatment of pensions. Public pension plans are generally seen as 
part of the safety net, generating large antipoverty effects through transfers and taxes 
(contributions). So, state old-age pension benefits will be included in our analysis on 
redistribution. But countries differ to a large extent in public versus private provision of their 
pensions (OECD, 2008:120). Occupational and private pensions are not antipoverty programs per 
se, although they too have a significant effect on redistribution when pre-tax-transfer inequality 
and post-tax-transfer inequality are measured at one moment in time, particularly among the 
elderly. The standard approach treats contributions to government pensions as a tax that 
finances the retirement pensions paid out in the same year, while contributions to private 
pensions are effectively treated as a form of private consumption. This may affect international 
comparisons of redistribution effects of social transfers and taxes. Overcoming this bias requires 
a choice: should pensions be earmarked as market income or as a transfer? We deal with this 
bias rather pragmatically by following LIS Household Income Variables List: occupational and 
private pensions are earmarked and threaded as market income (see Table 1, and Annex 1, Table 
A2).  
 
To illustrate the idea of decomposition disposable income inequality, Table 5 presents the results 
of our accounting exercise for the mean of all 36 LIS countries. Interestingly, only three 
programs account for 62 percent of total redistribution: public old age pensions and the survivors 
scheme (46%), social assistance (7%) and the disability scheme (9%). Income taxes account for 
another 15 percent of total redistribution. Other social benefit programs and contributions seem 
to have a rather limited redistributive effect; together they account for only 23 percent of the 
reduction in income inequality through taxes and transfers. 
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Table 5 Decomposition of disposable income inequality for LIS countries 2004 
 
 Gini  
(a) Gini primary income 0.468  
(b) Gini disposable income 0.328  
Overall redistribution (a-b) 0.140  
   
Partial effects  share 
   
Transfers 0.118 85% 
Sickness benefits  0.003 2% 
Occupational injury and disease benefits a 0.001 1% 
Disability benefits b 0.012 9% 
State old-age and survivors benefits c 0.064 46% 
Child/family benefits d 0.010 7% 
Unemployment compensation benefits e 0.006 5% 
Maternity and other family leave benefits f 0.004 3% 
Military/veterans/war benefits 0.001 1% 
Other social insurance benefits g 0.003 2% 
Social assistance cash benefits h 0.010 7% 
Near-cash benefits i 0.004 3% 
   
Taxes 0.021 15% 
Mandatory payroll taxes j 0.001 1% 
Income taxes 0.021 15% 
   
Overall redistribution 0.140 100% 
 
a Short-term occupational injury and disease benefits, Long-term occupational injury and disease benefits; 
Occupational injury and disease benefits n.e.c. 
b Disability pensions; Disability allowances; Disability benefits n.e.c. 
c Universal old-age pensions; Employment-related old-age pensions; Old-age pensions for public sector 
employees; Old-age pensions n.e.c.; Early retirement benefits; Survivors pensions; State old-age and survivors 
benefits n.e.c. 
d Child allowances; Advance maintenance; Orphans allowances; Child/family benefits n.e.c. 
e Unemployment insurance benefits; (Re)training allowances; Placement/resettlement benefits; Unemployment 
compensation benefits n.e.c. 
f Wage replacement; Birth grants; Child care leave benefits; Maternity and other family leave benefits n.e.c. 
g Invalid career benefits; Education benefits; Child care cash benefits; Other social insurance benefits n.e.c. 
h General social assistance benefits; Old-age and disability assistance benefits; Unemployment assistance 
benefits; Parents assistance benefits; Social assistance cash benefits n.e.c. 
i Near-cash food benefits; Near-cash housing benefits; Near-cash medical benefits; Near-cash heating benefits; 
Near-cash education benefits; Near-cash child care benefits; Near-cash benefits n.e.c. 
j Mandatory contributions for self-employment; Mandatory employee contributions. 
 
 
Source: own calculations based on LIS 
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It should be noted that our results are hardly affected by the ordering effect. Following equation 
(8), the partial redistributive effect of a specific social transfer will be highest (smallest) when 
computed as the first (last) social program; see section 3.3. A sensitivity analysis shows that 
changing the order of adding a specific benefit to primary income (or subtracting tax from gross 
income) does change the partial effect of this transfer (or tax) in total redistribution only slightly. 
In case we consider a specific social transfer as the last (instead of the first) program to be added 
to primary income distribution, the computed partial redistributive effect changes up to 1%-point 
at the highest. 
 
We have done the accounting exercise presented in Table 5 for all 36 countries listed in the LIS 
database; see Annex 2 for details. Here we only present the results of the decomposition of the 
trajectory of the Gini coefficient from primary to disposable income inequality for groups of 
countries. We clustered all countries to be a representative for Anglo-Saxon countries, 
Continental European countries, Nordic countries, according to Esping-Anderson types of welfare 
states (Esping-Andersen and Myles, 2009; Arts and Gelissen, 2002; Bonoli, 1997; Ferrera, 1996). 
Anglo-Saxon countries have low social expenditure as a percentage of GDP and low contributions 
as a percentage of social expenditure. Interventions from government are limited in the free 
market and the influence of wage negotiation is rather weak, comparing with e.g. European 
countries. These countries have high social expenditures and high contributions; social insurance 
systems are mainly financed by income taxes. Social transfers are generous as a rule. Nordic 
countries have high social expenditures and low contributions. High income taxes are combined 
with high social transfers and public investment. Southern European countries have low social 
expenditures and high contributions. Their developments of economic systems are similar to 
continental European countries (social market economy model), while their welfare states are a 
bit more similar to Anglo-Saxon countries. 
 
Table 6 presents the results of the decomposition of income inequality and the redistributive 
effect of several social transfers and taxes and contributions for 36 LIS countries around 2004. 
Some benefits or taxes do not have any redistributive effect. The meaning of this is twofold. First, 
such a benefit scheme does not exist in a specific country and/or data is not available in LIS 
(represented as ‘-‘). Second, such a program exist, but does not have a redistributive effect, 
because the social expenditures of this program is rather low or the program is distributed 
equally among the population (noted as 0%). 
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Table 6 Decomposition of income inequality and redistributive effect of social transfers and taxes around 2004 
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panel a: LIS Anglo-Saxon countries               
Australia 0.461 0.312 0.149 69% 0% 1% 8% 22% 13% 5% 8% 5% 5% 0% -  31% - 31%  
Canada 0.433 0.318 0.114 68% - 3% - 33% 10% 8% - - 4% 9% -  32% -2% 33%  
Ireland  0.490 0.312 0.178 76% 3% 0% 4% 20% 12% 4% 0% - 1% 28% 5% 24% 2% 22%  
UK 0.490 0.345 0.145 86% 0% 0% 12% 27% 6% 0% 0% 0% 2% 24% 15% 14% 3% 11%  
USA 0.482 0.372 0.109 63% - 1% 6% 34% 0% 2% - 2% 0% 13% 5% 37% 0% 38%  
panel b: LIS Continental European countries              
Austria 0.459 0.269 0.190 82% 1%  7% 57% 11% 5% - - 1% 1% 1% 18% 0% 18%  
Belgium 0.542 0.279 0.263 76% 1% 0% 2% 58% 5% 8% 0% - - 1% 0% 24% -    
France 0.449 0.281 0.168 91% 2% - 3% 47% 11% 9% 1% 1% 1% 7% 9% 9% - 9%  
Germany 0.489 0.278 0.210 77% - 1% 4% 52% 6% 5% 1% 0% 1% 6% 2% 23% 1% 22%  
Luxembourg 0.452 0.268 0.184 81% 0% - 8% 53% 12% 4% - - 0% 2% 1% 19% - 19%  
Switzerland 0.395 0.268 0.128 102% 1% 2% 0% 79% 4% 8% - 0% 1% 8% 0% -2% -8% 6%  
panel c: LIS Nordic countries                
Denmark 0.419 0.228 0.191 79% 3% - 12% 33% 4% 8% 2% 0% 4% 9% 5% 21% 0% 21%  
Finland 0.464 0.252 0.212 81% 1% 1% 9% 41% 5% 6% 3% 1% 2% 7% 3% 19% 2% 17%  
Netherlands 0.459 0.263 0.196 80% 1% - 9% 48% 3% 5% - - 2% 10% 3% 20% - 20%  
Norway 0.430 0.256 0.174 82% 13% 0% 15% 31% 7% 4% 5% - 3% 3% 1% 18% 1% 16%  
Sweden 0.442 0.237 0.205 84% 5% 1% 10% 38% 4% 8% 4% - 6% 3% 5% 16% 1% 15%  
panel d: LIS Southern European countries              
Greece 0.462 0.329 0.133 95% 1% - 5% 82% 3% 3% - - 0% 2% 0% 5% - 5%  
Italy 0.503 0.338 0.165 100% - 1% 4% 83% 3% 2% - 0% 0% 6% -    -    
Spain 0.441 0.315 0.126 99% 2% - 7% 80% 0% 8% - - 1% 0% 0% 1% - 1%  
                    
mean LIS-36 0.468 0.328 0.140 85% 2% 1% 9% 46% 7% 5% 3% 1% 2% 7% 3% 15% 1% 15%  
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Table 6 Decomposition of income inequality …… (continued) 
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panel e: LIS Central Eastern European countries              
Czech 
Republic 0.468 0.267 0.201 83% 2% - 8% 54% 5% 2% 3% - 2% 5% 1% 17% 4% 13%  
Estonia 0.493 0.340 0.153 79% 0% - 9% 56% 9% 1% 2% - 0% 1% -  21% 1% 20%  
Hungary 0.533 0.289 0.244 100% 1% 0% 14% 62% 7% 2% 6% - 0% 7% 0%  - - -   
Poland 0.527 0.320 0.207 98% 0% - 21% 61% 7% 3% 1% - - 4% 0% 2% 0% 2%  
Romania 0.372 0.277 0.095 85% 0% -  64% 11% 4% 0% 1% 3% 1% -  15% 2% 13%  
Slovak 
Republic  0.425 0.241 0.185 100% 2% - 1% 70% 12% 8% 4% - 0% 3% -  -  - -   
Slovenia 0.416 0.242 0.174 100% 1% - 1% 79% 8% 3% 2% - 2% 3% 0% -  - -   
panel f: Other LIS countries                
Brazil 0.570 0.486 0.084 84% - - - 58% 3% 4%  - 2% 18% -  16% 2% 13%  
Colombia 0.514 0.508 0.006 111% - - - 111% - -  - - - -  -11% -16% 4%  
Guatemala 0.521 0.507 0.014 17% - 7% - 5% - -  - 2% - 3% 83% 8% 75%  
Israel  0.491 0.370 0.121 66% - 0% 12% 21% 10% 3%  1% 2% 16% -  34% 2% 32%  
Korea 0.334 0.311 0.023 75% - - - 30% - -  - 45% - -  25% 3% 23%  
Mexico 0.476 0.458 0.018 100% - - - 41% - -  - 19% 40% -  -  - -   
Peru 0.512 0.507 0.005 100% - - - 100% - 0%  - - - -  -  - -   
Russia 0.562 0.434 0.127 100% - - 10% 80% 4% 1%  - 1% 0% 4% -  - -   
Taiwan 0.324 0.305 0.019 84% - - - -7% - -  - 40% 51%  - 16% -19% 35%  
Uruguay 0.542 0.428 0.114 100% - 0% - 73% 3% 2%  - - 21%  -  - - -   
                    
mean LIS-36 0.468 0.328 0.140 85% 2% 1% 9% 46% 7% 5% 3% 1% 2% 7% 3% 15% 1% 15%  
 
Source: own calculations based on LIS 
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In most countries two dominant income components account for above 50 to 60 percent of total 
reduction in income inequality: the public old age pensions and the survivors scheme, and the 
income taxes. Of course, the dominant effect of old age pensions makes sense, since the elderly 
have in general no income from work. However, cross country differences are huge. For example, 
in Southern European Countries the public old age benefits account for over 80 percent of total 
redistribution, while these figures are much lower for Anglo-Saxon Countries (20-34%), for 
Nordic Countries (31-48%), for Continental European Countries (47-57%) with the exception for 
Switzerland (79%), and for Central Eastern European Countries (54-70%) with the exception for 
Slovenia (79%). 
In Anglo-Saxon Countries income taxes play a major role (above 30%) compare to other 
countries (with the exception the United kingdom). The United States is a special case, because 
the income tax contributes for a relatively large part (38%) to the reduction of income inequality 
between primary and disposable incomes. Their earned income tax credit (EITC) is targeted 
towards the poor, which makes the US tax system rather progressive. Also the redistributive 
effect of social assistance in the Anglo-Saxon Countries is relatively high in a comparative setting 
(9-28%), with Australia as an exception. 
Child and family benefits are important in Anglo-Saxon Countries (6-13%), in Continental 
European Countries (4-12%), and in Central Eastern European Countries (5-12%). In Nordic 
Countries also a variety of other social programs contribute to the reduction of inequality, 
especially the disability scheme (9-15%). Remarkably, across countries all other social benefit 
programs seems to have rather limited redistributive effects, although the unemployment 
compensation benefits do have some effect too. 
The group of other LIS Countries is rather mixed. It is hard to draw a line through the observed 
decomposed elements of income inequality across these countries. See Table 6. 
 
 
6. Future research 
 
Our analysis on the disentanglement of income inequality and the redistributive effect of social 
transfers and taxes in 36 LIS countries so far was restricted to one moment in time (Wave VI of 
LIS). However, LIS data allow us to compare fiscal redistribution across the developed countries 
over the last three decades. Our approach and the use of LIS data will be of additional value to 
future researchers after we have created time-series across countries of detailed fiscal 
redistribution between the 1970s and the mid-2000s. Our Annex 3 offers a data set with a 
number of measures of fiscal redistribution in the developed countries, drawing upon data from 
177 Luxembourg Income Study surveys conducted in 36 countries between 1967 and 2006. In 
this dataset we have computed several results, namely income inequality before social transfers 
and taxes, income inequality after social transfers and taxes, the overall redistributive effect, the 
average size of social transfers as a proportion of households’ pre-tax income, a summary index 
of the degree to which transfers are targeted toward low-income groups, the partial effect of 
redistribution by several social transfers, and the partial effect of redistribution by several income 
taxes.10 Research can employ these data in addressing several important research issues. Among 
                                                 
10  Our results are in line with or within narrow bandwidths with results from LIS. LIS Key Figures presents 
slightly other figures for Gini disposable income for only 15 out of 177 datasets. The results on 
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the most commonly addressed questions in the empirical literature on the welfare state concerns 
the sources of variance across countries and over time in the extent and nature of fiscal 
redistribution. Changes (in the generosity) of welfare states can be linked to (changes in the 
fiscal redistribution). Best-practice among countries can be identified and analyzed in more detail. 
In exploring the causes and effects of welfare state redistribution in the developed world, the 
literature has increasingly moved towards more disaggregated measures of social policy, an 
enterprise in which the LIS, with its detailed data on taxes and a large number of individual social 
benefits, offers a rich source of information. LIS data are detailed enough to allow an in depth 
analysis on programs’ size and the extent to which they are targeted toward low-income groups. 
Is redistribution associated with transfers’ overall size or with their target efficiency? Is there, as 
is often suggested, a tradeoff between the two?  
In near future research could focus on households with very low income as well—those in poverty. 
The budget incidence approach based on LIS data allows us to employ all kind of cross-national 
analyses.11 How well is social expenditure targeted to the poor? Moreover, with LIS data on fiscal 
redistribution we are able to analyze differences in anti-poverty approaches of countries (Europe 
versus the United States) and/or to judge the effectiveness of poverty reduction by taxes and 
transfers across countries. 
Over time the use of household income survey data in policy analyses increased. Today the 
capacity to describe and analyze the effects of existing policy and simulate the effects of changes 
in policy is well-established in most nations with elaborate welfare states. The next step in 
improving policy analysis can come from moving to a cross-national focus using comparable 
income surveys on fiscal redistribution in a number of countries. To this end, we are able to 
assemble a databank of fiscal redistribution that can be used by scholars and policy analysts to 
study the effects of different kinds of programs on poverty, income adequacy in retirement, and 
the distribution of financial well-being generally. This project is named Leiden LIS Budget 
Incidence Database on Fiscal Redistribution Across Countries and is available at 
www.hsz.leidenuniv.nl. 
 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
In this paper, we have investigated income distribution and redistributive effect attributed to 
social transfers and taxes across 36 countries around 2004, based on the micro household 
income data from LIS. We have provided primary and disposable income inequality, total and 
disaggregated redistributions in a comparative way, across much more countries than that have 
been studied before, offering an accurate, detailed picture of redistribution of incomes through 
taxes and transfers across social welfare states. 
Different social policies bring different types of welfare systems, leading to various outcomes in 
the income distribution. Among all LIS countries listed in this paper, Denmark and Sweden have 
the smallest income disparity, while Peru and Colombia have the largest. Nordic countries show 
the most equally distributed disposable incomes and primary incomes, comparing to the countries 
                                                                                                                                                              
redistribution are in line with Jesuit and Mahler (2004), and Mahler and Jesuit (2006). See our 
downloadable Leiden LIS Budget Incidence Fiscal Redistribution Dataset. 
11  In line with our earlier work. See Caminada and Goudswaard (2009 and 2010); Caminada et al (2011) 
and Caminada and Martin (2011). 
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in other kinds of welfare states. On average, large primary income disparity exists in Anglo-
Saxon countries. Generally speaking, European countries achieve lower levels of income 
inequality than other countries.  
With respect to redistributive effect, our budget incidence analysis indicates that the pattern is 
diverse across countries. The largest redistribution is found for Belgium, while Colombia and Peru 
show rather limited overall redistributive effects. On average transfers reduce income inequality 
by over 85 percent, while taxes account for 15 percent of redistribution. Tax systems in 
Switzerland and Colombia are regressive. Transfers still play a dominant role in most countries in 
reducing initial income disparities. Among all welfare states, Continental European countries 
(Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg and the Netherlands) achieve the highest level of the 
reduction of initial income inequality. 
Mahler and Jesuit (2006) divided government redistribution only into three general components 
(from unemployment benefits, from pensions, and from taxes) and applied their analysis to 13 
countries. We update and extent their analyses by taking into account many more benefits and 
taxes, and we have applied a budget incidence analysis to all 36 LIS countries with the most 
recent LIS data (around 2004). As far as social programs is concerned, in most countries two 
dominant income components account for above 50 to 60 percent of total reduction in income 
inequality: the public old age pensions and the survivors scheme, and the income taxes. For 
example, in Southern European Countries the public old age benefits account for over 80 percent 
of total redistribution, while these figures are much lower for Anglo-Saxon Countries (20-34%), 
for Nordic Countries (31-48%), for Continental European Countries (47-57%), and for Central 
Eastern European Countries (54-70%). In Anglo-Saxon Countries income taxes play a major role 
(above 30%) compare to other countries (with the exception the United kingdom). Also the 
redistributive effect of social assistance and child and family benefits in the Anglo-Saxon 
Countries are relatively high in a comparative setting (9-28%). In Nordic Countries also a variety 
of other social programs contribute to the reduction of inequality, especially the disability scheme 
(9-15%). Remarkably, across countries all other social benefit programs seem to have rather 
limited redistributive effects, although the unemployment compensation benefits do have some 
effect too. 
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Annex 1: LIS Household Income Components List 
 
Luxembourg Income Study contains information for a large number of countries for one or more 
than one year of data from wave I (the earliest year is in 1967) to wave VI (the latest year is in 
2006). LIS contains information of income microdata in LIS database, wealth microdata in LWS 
database and country-level poverty and inequality indicators in LIS Key Figures. Research on 
income distribution across countries attracted many attentions, with the rapid development of 
comparable data from LIS. As a “public good”, the LIS project is funded on a continuing basis by 
its member countries’ national science foundations and social science research foundations 
(Smeeding, 2008). LIS database contains variables both at a household level and at a personal 
level, in which personal files also include labor market variables. This paper focuses on income 
information at the household level. 
Below we provide the household income components list, by variable name and meaning. More 
specific explanation of the data can be found in the user-friendly LIS website 
(http://www.lisdatacenter.org/). In Table A3 household income is divided into 8 parts: wages and 
salaries, self-employment income, property income, occupational and private pensions, social 
security cash benefits, private transfers, other cash income and income tax (and employee social 
security contributions). In each part, there are more specific income sources, which is very 
helpful for studies focusing on different elements of income. For instance, v4 and v5 show self-
employment income; v16 – v26 report social security cash benefits; v7, v11 and v13 provide 
income taxes and mandatory payroll taxes. There are also four kinds of widely used income 
definitions: factor income, market income, gross income and disposable income. Table A2 
provides household aggregated income sources. Using those aggregated variables, it is more 
convenient to process and present income distribution results.  
In this paper we compute five kinds of results, namely income inequality before social transfers 
and taxes, income inequality after social transfers and taxes, the overall redistributive effect, the 
partial effect of redistribution by several social transfers and the partial effect of redistribution by 
several income taxes (see for a specification in Table A2). In calculating pre-government income 
inequality, we use primary income, which consists of market income (mi), Alimony/child support 
(v34), regular private transfers (v35) and other cash income (v36); in calculating post-
government income, we use net disposable income (dpi). In order to obtain redistributive effect, 
besides the variables mentioned above, we use total social transfers (SOCTRANS), mandatory 
payroll taxes (PAYROLL) and income taxes (v11). For some countries (Belgium, France, Greece, 
Hungary, Italy, Mexico, Peru, Russia, Spain, Uruguay), we use net wages and salaries (v1net) 
instead of gross wages and salaries (v1) as a component of market income 
(v1+v4+v5+v8+v32+v33), due to v1 is not available in the dataset. In addition, we use the 
number of persons in a household (D4) and household weight (HWEIGHT) in LIS dataset so as to 
obtain equivalised income and weighted results. 
 
 38 
Table A1 LIS income distribution indicator list 
 
Income 
Distribution 
Indicator 
Redistribution 
Measurement Specific Income Source 
Gini (pri)  Primary Income 
(V1+V4+V5+V8+V32+V33+V34+V35+V36) 
Transfers 
Redistribution 
Gini (pri)-Gini 
(pri+trans) 
 
Gini (pri+trans)  
Primary Income + social transfers 
(V1+V4+V5+V8+V32+V33+V34+V35+V36+V16+V17+
V18+V19+V20+V21+V22+V23+V24+V25+V26) 
Taxes 
Redistribution 
Gini (pri+trans)-Gini 
(dpi) 
 
Gini (dpi)  
Net disposable Income 
(V1+V4+V5+V8+V32+V33+V34+V35+V36+V16+V17+
V18+V19+V20+V21+V22+V23+V24+V25+V26-
V7+V13-V11) 
Overall 
Redistribution 
Gini (pri)-Gini (dpi)  
 
 
Source: LIS (2011)
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Table A2 Household income variables in LIS dataset 
 
Wages and salaries V1/V1NET Gross wages and salaries / Net wages and salaries V1 / V1NET 
V4 Farm self-employment income V4 Self-employment 
income V5 Non-farm self-employment income V5 
V7 Mandatory contributions for self-employment 
V13 Mandatory employee contributions 
V7 + V13  
Mandatory payroll 
taxes 
Income tax and 
employee social 
security 
contributions V11 Income taxes V11 
V8S1 Interest and dividends 
V8S2 Rental income 
V8S3 Private savings plans 
V8S4 Royalties 
Property income 
V8SR Cash property income n.e.c. 
V8 
Cash property 
income 
V16 Sickness benefits V16 
V17S1 Short-term occupational injury and disease benefits 
V17S2 Long-term occupational injury and disease benefits 
V17SR Occupational injury and disease benefits n.e.c. 
V17 
Occupational injury 
and disease benefits 
V18S1 Disability pensions 
V18S2 Disability allowances 
V18SR Disability benefits n.e.c. 
V18 
Disability benefits 
V19S1a Universal old-age pensions 
V19S1b Employment-related old-age pensions 
V19S1c 
Old-age pensions for public sector 
employees 
V19S1r Old-age pensions n.e.c. 
V19S1 
Old-age 
pensions 
V19S3 Early retirement benefits 
V19S4 Survivors pensions 
V19SR State old-age and survivors benefits n.e.c. 
V19 
State old-age and 
survivors benefits 
V20S1 Child allowances 
V20S2 Advance maintenance 
V20S3 Orphans allowances 
V20SR Child/family benefits n.e.c. 
V20 
Child/family benefits 
V21S1 Unemployment insurance benefits 
V21S2 (Re)training allowances 
V21S3 Placement/resettlement benefits 
V21SR Unemployment compensation benefits n.e.c. 
V21 
Unemployment 
compensation 
benefits 
V22S1 Wage replacement 
V22S2 Birth grants 
V22S3 Child care leave benefits 
V22SR Maternity and other family leave benefits n.e.c. 
V22 
Maternity and other 
family leave 
benefits 
V23 Military/veterans/war benefits V23 
V24S1 Invalid carer benefits 
V24S2 Education benefits 
V24S3 Child care cash benefits 
V24SR Other social insurance benefits n.e.c. 
V24 
Other social 
insurance benefits 
V25S1 General social assistance benefits 
V25S2 Old-age and disability assistance benefits 
Social security 
cash benefits 
V25S3 Unemployment assistance benefits 
V25 
Social assistance 
cash benefits 
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V25S4 Parents assistance benefits 
V25SR Social assistance cash benefits n.e.c. 
V26S1 Near-cash food benefits 
V26S2 Near-cash housing benefits 
V26S3 Near-cash medical benefits 
V26S4 Near-cash heating benefits 
V26S5 Near-cash education benefits 
V26S6 Near-cash child care benefits 
V26SR Near-cash benefits n.e.c. 
V26 
Near-cash benefits 
V32S1a Mandatory occupational pensions 
V32S1b Voluntary occupational pensions 
V32S1r Occupational pensions n.e.c. 
V32S1 
Occupational 
pensions 
V32S2 Mandatory individual retirement pensions 
V32SR Private occupational and other pensions n.e.c. 
V32 
Private occupational 
and other pensions 
Occupational and 
private pensions 
V33 Public sector occupational pensions V33 
V34 Alimony/child support V34 
V35S1 Regular transfers from relatives 
V35S2 Regular transfers from private charity 
Private transfers 
V35SR Regular private transfers n.e.c. 
V35 Regular private 
transfers 
Other cash income V36 Other cash income V36 
 
Source: LIS (2011)  
 
Table A3 Household aggregated income variables in LIS dataset 
 
SELFI Self-employment income  V4 + V5 
EARNING Earnings  V1 + SELFI (V4+V5) 
EARNNET Net earnings  V1NET + SELFI (V4+V5) 
FI Factor income  EARNING (V1+V4+V5) + V8 
FINET Net factor income  EARNNET (V1NET+V4+V5) + V8 
PENSIOI Occupational pensions  V32 + V33  
MI Market income  FI (V1+V4+V5+V8) + PENSIOI (V32+V33) 
MINET Net market income  FINET (V1NET+V4+V5+V8) + PENSIOI (V32+V33) 
OTHSOCI Social insurance transfers excl V19-V21  V16 + V17 + V18 + V22 + V23 + V24 
SOCI Social insurance transfers  OTHSOCI (V16+V17+V18+V22+V23+V24) + V19 + V20 + V21 
MEANSI Social assistance transfers  V25 + V26 
SOCTRANS Social transfers  SOCI (V16+V17+V18+V19+V20+V21+V22+V23+V24) + MEANSI (V25+V26) 
PRIVATI Private transfers  V34 + V35 
TRANSI 
Transfer income  SOCTRANS (V16+V17+V18+V19+V20+V21+V22+V23+V24+V25+V26) + PRIVATI 
(V34+V35) 
GI 
Gross income  MI (V1+V4+V5+V8+V32+V33) + TRANSI 
(V16+V17+V18+V19+V20+V21+V22+V23+V24+V25+V26+V34+V35) + V36 
GINET 
Net income  MINET (V1NET+V4+V5+V8+V32+V33) + TRANSI 
(V16+V17+V18+V19+V20+V21+V22+V23+V24+V25+V26+V34+V35) + V36 
PAYROLL Mandatory payroll taxes  V7 + V13 
DPI 
Net disposable income  GI 
(V1+V4+V5+V8+V16+V17+V18+V19+V20+V21+V22+V23+V24+V25+V26+V32+V33+V34+V35+V36) 
- PAYROLL (V7+V13) - V11 
 
Source: LIS (2011) 
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Annex 2:  Decomposition of income inequality and redistributive effect of social 
transfers and taxes in 36 LIS countries around 2004 
 
 Australia 2003 Austria 2004 
 Gini  Gini  
(a) Gini primary income 0.461   0.459   
(b) Gini disposable income 0.312   0.269   
Overall redistribution (a-b) 0.149   0.190   
 
Partial effects   Share a   Share a 
Sickness benefits  0.000 0% 0.001 1% 
Occupational injury and disease benefits 0.002 1% - - 
Disability benefits  0.012 8% 0.013 7% 
State old-age and survivors benefits 0.033 22% 0.112 57% 
Child/family benefits 0.020 13% 0.022 11% 
Unemployment compensation benefits 0.008 5% 0.010 5% 
Maternity and other family leave benefits 0.013 8% - - 
Military/veterans/war benefits 0.008 5% - - 
Other social insurance benefits 0.008 5% 0.001 1% 
Social assistance cash benefits  0.000 0% 0.001 1% 
Near-cash benefits - - 0.001 1% 
Mandatory payroll taxes - - - - 
Income taxes 0.047 31% 0.034 18% 
Other a 0.002  0.006  
Overall redistribution 0.151 100% 0.196 100% 
 
 Belgium 2000 Brazil 2006 
 Gini  Gini  
(a) Gini primary income 0.542   0.570   
(b) Gini disposable income 0.279   0.486   
Overall redistribution (a-b) 0.263   0.084   
 
Partial effects   Share a   Share a 
Sickness benefits  0.003 1% - - 
Occupational injury and disease benefits 0.001 0% - - 
Disability benefits  0.006 2% - - 
State old-age and survivors benefits 0.156 58% 0.050 58% 
Child/family benefits 0.013 5% 0.002 3% 
Unemployment compensation benefits 0.022 8% 0.004 4% 
Maternity and other family leave benefits 0.001 0% - - 
Military/veterans/war benefits - - - - 
Other social insurance benefits - - 0.002 2% 
Social assistance cash benefits  0.004 1% 0.016 18% 
Near-cash benefits 0.001 0% - - 
Mandatory payroll taxes 0.002 2% 
Income taxes 
0.063 24% 
0.011 13% 
Other a 0.005  0.003  
Overall redistribution 0.268 100% 0.086 100% 
 
a Including ordering effect. The partial redistributive effect of a specific social transfer will be highest (smallest) 
when computed as the first (last) social program. The partial effects of these transfers in total redistribution 
could be computed in several orders. We consider every specific social transfer as the first program to be added 
to primary income distribution, and every direct tax as the first tax to be subtracted from gross income. In that 
case, the sum of all partial redistributive effects amount (a little) over 100 percent. We rescaled the 
redistributive effects of each program by applying an adjustment factor, which is defined as the overall 
redistribution given by formula (4) (100%) divided by sum of all partial redistributive effects of all programs 
(over 100%), in order to correct for an over-estimated effect. 
 
Source: LIS (2011), and own calculations. 
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Annex 2: continued 
 
 Canada 2004 Colombia 2004 
 Gini  Gini  
(a) Gini primary income 0.433   0.514   
(b) Gini disposable income 0.318   0.508   
Overall redistribution (a-b) 0.114   0.006   
 
Partial effects   Share a   Share a 
Sickness benefits  - - - - 
Occupational injury and disease benefits 0.004 3% - - 
Disability benefits  - - - - 
State old-age and survivors benefits 0.038 33% 0.006 111% 
Child/family benefits 0.012 10% - - 
Unemployment compensation benefits 0.009 8% - - 
Maternity and other family leave benefits - - - - 
Military/veterans/war benefits - - - - 
Other social insurance benefits 0.005 4% - - 
Social assistance cash benefits  0.011 9% - - 
Near-cash benefits - - - - 
Mandatory payroll taxes -0.002 -2% -0.001 -16% 
Income taxes 0.039 33% 0.000 4% 
Other a 0.002  0.000  
Overall redistribution 0.116 100% 0.006 100% 
 
 Czech Republic 2004 Denmark 2004 
 Gini  Gini  
(a) Gini primary income 0.468   0.419   
(b) Gini disposable income 0.267   0.228   
Overall redistribution (a-b) 0.201   0.191   
 
Partial effects   Share a   Share a 
Sickness benefits  0.005 2% 0.007 3% 
Occupational injury and disease benefits - - - - 
Disability benefits  0.017 8% 0.024 12% 
State old-age and survivors benefits 0.112 54% 0.066 33% 
Child/family benefits 0.009 5% 0.008 4% 
Unemployment compensation benefits 0.005 2% 0.015 8% 
Maternity and other family leave benefits 0.006 3% 0.003 2% 
Military/veterans/war benefits - - 0.000 0% 
Other social insurance benefits 0.003 2% 0.008 4% 
Social assistance cash benefits  0.011 5% 0.017 9% 
Near-cash benefits 0.002 1% 0.010 5% 
Mandatory payroll taxes 0.008 4% 0.000 0% 
Income taxes 0.027 13% 0.041 21% 
Other a 0.005  0.009  
Overall redistribution 0.206 100% 0.200 100% 
 
a Including ordering effect. The partial redistributive effect of a specific social transfer will be highest (smallest) 
when computed as the first (last) social program. The partial effects of these transfers in total redistribution 
could be computed in several orders. We consider every specific social transfer as the first program to be added 
to primary income distribution, and every direct tax as the first tax to be subtracted from gross income. In that 
case, the sum of all partial redistributive effects amount (a little) over 100 percent. We rescaled the 
redistributive effects of each program by applying an adjustment factor, which is defined as the overall 
redistribution given by formula (4) (100%) divided by sum of all partial redistributive effects of all programs 
(over 100%), in order to correct for an over-estimated effect. 
 
Source: LIS (2011), and own calculations. 
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Annex 2: continued 
 
 Estonia 2004 Finland 2004 
 Gini  Gini  
(a) Gini primary income 0.493   0.464   
(b) Gini disposable income 0.340   0.252   
Overall redistribution (a-b) 0.153   0.212   
 
Partial effects   Share a   Share a 
Sickness benefits  0.001 0% 0.003 1% 
Occupational injury and disease benefits - - 0.003 1% 
Disability benefits  0.015 9% 0.021 9% 
State old-age and survivors benefits 0.089 56% 0.092 41% 
Child/family benefits 0.015 9% 0.011 5% 
Unemployment compensation benefits 0.001 1% 0.014 6% 
Maternity and other family leave benefits 0.003 2% 0.008 3% 
Military/veterans/war benefits - - 0.002 1% 
Other social insurance benefits 0.000 0% 0.004 2% 
Social assistance cash benefits  0.002 1% 0.016 7% 
Near-cash benefits - - 0.007 3% 
Mandatory payroll taxes 0.002 1% 0.004 2% 
Income taxes 0.031 20% 0.038 17% 
Other a 0.004  0.010  
Overall redistribution 0.158 100% 0.222 100% 
 
 France 2005 Germany 2004 
 Gini  Gini  
(a) Gini primary income 0.449   0.489   
(b) Gini disposable income 0.281   0.278   
Overall redistribution (a-b) 0.168   0.210   
 
Partial effects   Share a   Share a 
Sickness benefits  0.003 2% - - 
Occupational injury and disease benefits - - 0.001 1% 
Disability benefits  0.006 3% 0.009 4% 
State old-age and survivors benefits 0.084 47% 0.111 52% 
Child/family benefits 0.019 11% 0.014 6% 
Unemployment compensation benefits 0.016 9% 0.010 5% 
Maternity and other family leave benefits 0.002 1% 0.002 1% 
Military/veterans/war benefits 0.001 1% 0.001 0% 
Other social insurance benefits 0.002 1% 0.002 1% 
Social assistance cash benefits  0.012 7% 0.012 6% 
Near-cash benefits 0.016 9% 0.005 2% 
Mandatory payroll taxes - - 0.002 1% 
Income taxes 0.017 9% 0.047 22% 
Other a 0.011  0.003  
Overall redistribution 0.179 100% 0.214 100% 
 
a Including ordering effect. The partial redistributive effect of a specific social transfer will be highest (smallest) 
when computed as the first (last) social program. The partial effects of these transfers in total redistribution 
could be computed in several orders. We consider every specific social transfer as the first program to be added 
to primary income distribution, and every direct tax as the first tax to be subtracted from gross income. In that 
case, the sum of all partial redistributive effects amount (a little) over 100 percent. We rescaled the 
redistributive effects of each program by applying an adjustment factor, which is defined as the overall 
redistribution given by formula (4) (100%) divided by sum of all partial redistributive effects of all programs 
(over 100%), in order to correct for an over-estimated effect. 
 
Source: LIS (2011), and own calculations.
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Annex 2: continued 
 
 Greece 2004 Guatemala 2006 
 Gini  Gini  
(a) Gini primary income 0.462   0.521   
(b) Gini disposable income 0.329   0.507   
Overall redistribution (a-b) 0.133   0.014   
 
Partial effects   Share a   Share a 
Sickness benefits  0.001 1% - - 
Occupational injury and disease benefits - - 0.001 7% 
Disability benefits  0.006 5% - - 
State old-age and survivors benefits 0.113 82% 0.001 5% 
Child/family benefits 0.003 3% - - 
Unemployment compensation benefits 0.004 3% - - 
Maternity and other family leave benefits - - - - 
Military/veterans/war benefits - - - - 
Other social insurance benefits 0.000 0% 0.000 2% 
Social assistance cash benefits  0.003 2% - - 
Near-cash benefits 0.000 0% 0.000 3% 
Mandatory payroll taxes - - 0.001 8% 
Income taxes 0.007 5% 0.011 75% 
Other a 0.004  0.000  
Overall redistribution 0.137 100% 0.014 100% 
 
 Hungary 2005 Ireland 2004 
 Gini  Gini  
(a) Gini primary income 0.533   0.490   
(b) Gini disposable income 0.289   0.312   
Overall redistribution (a-b) 0.244   0.178   
 
Partial effects   Share a   Share a 
Sickness benefits  0.002 1% 0.005 3% 
Occupational injury and disease benefits 0.001 0% 0.000 0% 
Disability benefits  0.039 14% 0.007 4% 
State old-age and survivors benefits 0.165 62% 0.036 20% 
Child/family benefits 0.018 7% 0.021 12% 
Unemployment compensation benefits 0.006 2% 0.007 4% 
Maternity and other family leave benefits 0.017 6% 0.000 0% 
Military/veterans/war benefits - - - - 
Other social insurance benefits 0.001 0% 0.002 1% 
Social assistance cash benefits  0.019 7% 0.052 28% 
Near-cash benefits 0.001 0% 0.008 5% 
Mandatory payroll taxes - - 0.004 2% 
Income taxes - - 0.041 22% 
Other a 0.023  0.007  
Overall redistribution 0.268 100% 0.185 100% 
 
a Including ordering effect. The partial redistributive effect of a specific social transfer will be highest (smallest) 
when computed as the first (last) social program. The partial effects of these transfers in total redistribution 
could be computed in several orders. We consider every specific social transfer as the first program to be added 
to primary income distribution, and every direct tax as the first tax to be subtracted from gross income. In that 
case, the sum of all partial redistributive effects amount (a little) over 100 percent. We rescaled the 
redistributive effects of each program by applying an adjustment factor, which is defined as the overall 
redistribution given by formula (4) (100%) divided by sum of all partial redistributive effects of all programs 
(over 100%), in order to correct for an over-estimated effect. 
 
Source: LIS (2011), and own calculations. 
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Annex 2: continued 
 
 Israel 2005 Italy 2004 
 Gini  Gini  
(a) Gini primary income 0.491   0.503   
(b) Gini disposable income 0.370   0.338   
Overall redistribution (a-b) 0.121   0.165   
 
Partial effects   Share a   Share a 
Sickness benefits  - - - - 
Occupational injury and disease benefits 0.001 0% 0.002 1% 
Disability benefits  0.015 12% 0.007 4% 
State old-age and survivors benefits 0.025 21% 0.143 83% 
Child/family benefits 0.012 10% 0.005 3% 
Unemployment compensation benefits 0.003 3% 0.003 2% 
Maternity and other family leave benefits - - - - 
Military/veterans/war benefits 0.001 1% 0.001 0% 
Other social insurance benefits 0.003 2% 0.000 0% 
Social assistance cash benefits  0.020 16% 0.011 6% 
Near-cash benefits - - - - 
Mandatory payroll taxes 0.002 2% - - 
Income taxes 0.039 32% - - 
Other a 0.001  0.007  
Overall redistribution 0.122 100% 0.172 100% 
 
 Korea 2006 Luxembourg 2004 
 Gini  Gini  
(a) Gini primary income 0.334   0.452   
(b) Gini disposable income 0.311   0.268   
Overall redistribution (a-b) 0.023   0.184   
 
Partial effects   Share a   Share a 
Sickness benefits  - - 0.001 0% 
Occupational injury and disease benefits - - - - 
Disability benefits  - - 0.016 8% 
State old-age and survivors benefits 0.007 30% 0.101 53% 
Child/family benefits - - 0.022 12% 
Unemployment compensation benefits - - 0.008 4% 
Maternity and other family leave benefits - - - - 
Military/veterans/war benefits - - - - 
Other social insurance benefits 0.010 45% 0.000 0% 
Social assistance cash benefits  - - 0.005 2% 
Near-cash benefits - - 0.001 1% 
Mandatory payroll taxes 0.001 3% - - 
Income taxes 0.005 23% 0.037 19% 
Other a 0.000  0.006  
Overall redistribution 0.023 100% 0.190 100% 
 
a Including ordering effect. The partial redistributive effect of a specific social transfer will be highest (smallest) 
when computed as the first (last) social program. The partial effects of these transfers in total redistribution 
could be computed in several orders. We consider every specific social transfer as the first program to be added 
to primary income distribution, and every direct tax as the first tax to be subtracted from gross income. In that 
case, the sum of all partial redistributive effects amount (a little) over 100 percent. We rescaled the 
redistributive effects of each program by applying an adjustment factor, which is defined as the overall 
redistribution given by formula (4) (100%) divided by sum of all partial redistributive effects of all programs 
(over 100%), in order to correct for an over-estimated effect. 
 
Source: LIS (2011), and own calculations. 
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Annex 2: continued 
 
 Mexico 2004 Netherlands 2004 
 Gini  Gini  
(a) Gini primary income 0.476   0.459   
(b) Gini disposable income 0.458   0.263   
Overall redistribution (a-b) 0.018   0.196   
 
Partial effects   Share a   Share a 
Sickness benefits  - - 0.002 1% 
Occupational injury and disease benefits - - - - 
Disability benefits  - - 0.018 9% 
State old-age and survivors benefits 0.008 41% 0.098 48% 
Child/family benefits - - 0.006 3% 
Unemployment compensation benefits - - 0.010 5% 
Maternity and other family leave benefits - - - - 
Military/veterans/war benefits - - - - 
Other social insurance benefits 0.003 19% 0.003 2% 
Social assistance cash benefits  0.008 40% 0.020 10% 
Near-cash benefits - - 0.006 3% 
Mandatory payroll taxes - - - - 
Income taxes - - 0.040 20% 
Other a 0.001  0.008  
Overall redistribution 0.019 100% 0.203 100% 
 
 Norway 2004 Peru 2004 
 Gini  Gini  
(a) Gini primary income 0.430   0.512   
(b) Gini disposable income 0.256   0.507   
Overall redistribution (a-b) 0.174   0.005   
 
Partial effects   Share a   Share a 
Sickness benefits  0.024 13% - - 
Occupational injury and disease benefits 0.000 0% - - 
Disability benefits  0.028 15% - - 
State old-age and survivors benefits 0.056 31% 0.005 100% 
Child/family benefits 0.012 7% - - 
Unemployment compensation benefits 0.007 4% 0.000 0% 
Maternity and other family leave benefits 0.009 5% - - 
Military/veterans/war benefits - - - - 
Other social insurance benefits 0.005 3% - - 
Social assistance cash benefits  0.006 3% - - 
Near-cash benefits 0.002 1% - - 
Mandatory payroll taxes 0.003 1% - - 
Income taxes 0.030 16% - - 
Other a 0.007  0.000  
Overall redistribution 0.181 100% 0.005 100% 
 
a Including ordering effect. The partial redistributive effect of a specific social transfer will be highest (smallest) 
when computed as the first (last) social program. The partial effects of these transfers in total redistribution 
could be computed in several orders. We consider every specific social transfer as the first program to be added 
to primary income distribution, and every direct tax as the first tax to be subtracted from gross income. In that 
case, the sum of all partial redistributive effects amount (a little) over 100 percent. We rescaled the 
redistributive effects of each program by applying an adjustment factor, which is defined as the overall 
redistribution given by formula (4) (100%) divided by sum of all partial redistributive effects of all programs 
(over 100%), in order to correct for an over-estimated effect. 
 
Source: LIS (2011), and own calculations. 
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Annex 2: continued 
 
 Poland 2004 Romania 1997 
 Gini  Gini  
(a) Gini primary income 0.527   0.372   
(b) Gini disposable income 0.320   0.277   
Overall redistribution (a-b) 0.207   0.095   
 
Partial effects   Share a   Share a 
Sickness benefits  0.001 0% 0.000 0% 
Occupational injury and disease benefits - - - - 
Disability benefits  0.048 21% - - 
State old-age and survivors benefits 0.138 61% 0.063 64% 
Child/family benefits 0.015 7% 0.011 11% 
Unemployment compensation benefits 0.007 3% 0.004 4% 
Maternity and other family leave benefits 0.002 1% 0.000 0% 
Military/veterans/war benefits - - 0.001 1% 
Other social insurance benefits - - 0.003 3% 
Social assistance cash benefits  0.009 4% 0.001 1% 
Near-cash benefits 0.000 0% - - 
Mandatory payroll taxes - - 0.002 2% 
Income taxes 0.005 2% 0.013 13% 
Other a 0.018  0.003  
Overall redistribution 0.225 100% 0.098 100% 
 
 Russia 2000 Slovak Republic 1996 
 Gini  Gini  
(a) Gini primary income 0.562   0.425   
(b) Gini disposable income 0.434   0.241   
Overall redistribution (a-b) 0.127   0.185   
 
Partial effects   Share a   Share a 
Sickness benefits  - - 0.003 2% 
Occupational injury and disease benefits - - - - 
Disability benefits  0.013 10% 0.002 1% 
State old-age and survivors benefits 0.107 80% 0.136 70% 
Child/family benefits 0.006 4% 0.024 12% 
Unemployment compensation benefits 0.001 1% 0.015 8% 
Maternity and other family leave benefits - - 0.009 4% 
Military/veterans/war benefits - - - - 
Other social insurance benefits 0.001 1% 0.001 0% 
Social assistance cash benefits  0.000 0% 0.005 3% 
Near-cash benefits 0.005 4% - - 
Mandatory payroll taxes - - - - 
Income taxes - - - - 
Other a 0.006  0.011  
Overall redistribution 0.134 100% 0.196 100% 
 
a Including ordering effect. The partial redistributive effect of a specific social transfer will be highest (smallest) 
when computed as the first (last) social program. The partial effects of these transfers in total redistribution 
could be computed in several orders. We consider every specific social transfer as the first program to be added 
to primary income distribution, and every direct tax as the first tax to be subtracted from gross income. In that 
case, the sum of all partial redistributive effects amount (a little) over 100 percent. We rescaled the 
redistributive effects of each program by applying an adjustment factor, which is defined as the overall 
redistribution given by formula (4) (100%) divided by sum of all partial redistributive effects of all programs 
(over 100%), in order to correct for an over-estimated effect. 
 
Source: LIS (2011), and own calculations. 
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Annex 2: continued 
 
 Slovenia 2004 Spain 2004 
 Gini  Gini  
(a) Gini primary income 0.416   0.441   
(b) Gini disposable income 0.242   0.315   
Overall redistribution (a-b) 0.174   0.126   
 
Partial effects   Share a   Share a 
Sickness benefits  0.002 1% 0.003 2% 
Occupational injury and disease benefits - - - - 
Disability benefits  0.001 1% 0.009 7% 
State old-age and survivors benefits 0.143 79% 0.105 80% 
Child/family benefits 0.015 8% 0.001 0% 
Unemployment compensation benefits 0.006 3% 0.011 8% 
Maternity and other family leave benefits 0.004 2% - - 
Military/veterans/war benefits - - - - 
Other social insurance benefits 0.004 2% 0.001 1% 
Social assistance cash benefits  0.005 3% 0.000 0% 
Near-cash benefits 0.000 0% 0.000 0% 
Mandatory payroll taxes - - - - 
Income taxes - - 0.001 1% 
Other a 0.006  0.005  
Overall redistribution 0.180 100% 0.131 100% 
 
 Sweden 2005 Switzerland 2004 
 Gini  Gini  
(a) Gini primary income 0.442   0.395   
(b) Gini disposable income 0.237   0.268   
Overall redistribution (a-b) 0.205   0.128   
 
Partial effects   Share a   Share a 
Sickness benefits  0.012 5% 0.002 1% 
Occupational injury and disease benefits 0.002 1% 0.002 2% 
Disability benefits  0.022 10% 0.000 0% 
State old-age and survivors benefits 0.082 38% 0.103 79% 
Child/family benefits 0.009 4% 0.006 4% 
Unemployment compensation benefits 0.017 8% 0.010 8% 
Maternity and other family leave benefits 0.009 4% - - 
Military/veterans/war benefits - - 0.000 0% 
Other social insurance benefits 0.013 6% 0.001 1% 
Social assistance cash benefits  0.008 3% 0.010 8% 
Near-cash benefits 0.010 5% 0.000 0% 
Mandatory payroll taxes 0.001 1% -0.011 -8% 
Income taxes 0.033 15% 0.008 6% 
Other a 0.013  0.003  
Overall redistribution 0.218 100% 0.131 100% 
 
a Including ordering effect. The partial redistributive effect of a specific social transfer will be highest (smallest) 
when computed as the first (last) social program. The partial effects of these transfers in total redistribution 
could be computed in several orders. We consider every specific social transfer as the first program to be added 
to primary income distribution, and every direct tax as the first tax to be subtracted from gross income. In that 
case, the sum of all partial redistributive effects amount (a little) over 100 percent. We rescaled the 
redistributive effects of each program by applying an adjustment factor, which is defined as the overall 
redistribution given by formula (4) (100%) divided by sum of all partial redistributive effects of all programs 
(over 100%), in order to correct for an over-estimated effect. 
 
Source: LIS (2011), and own calculations. 
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Annex 2: continued 
 
 Taiwan 2005 United Kingdom 2004 
 Gini  Gini  
(a) Gini primary income 0.324   0.490   
(b) Gini disposable income 0.305   0.345   
Overall redistribution (a-b) 0.019   0.145   
 
Partial effects   Share a   Share a 
Sickness benefits  - - 0.000 0% 
Occupational injury and disease benefits - - 0.001 0% 
Disability benefits  - - 0.018 12% 
State old-age and survivors benefits -0.001 -7% 0.041 27% 
Child/family benefits - - 0.009 6% 
Unemployment compensation benefits - - 0.000 0% 
Maternity and other family leave benefits - - 0.000 0% 
Military/veterans/war benefits - - 0.001 0% 
Other social insurance benefits 0.008 40% 0.003 2% 
Social assistance cash benefits  0.010 51% 0.036 24% 
Near-cash benefits - - 0.023 15% 
Mandatory payroll taxes -0.004 -19% 0.004 3% 
Income taxes 0.007 35% 0.016 11% 
Other a 0.001  0.008  
Overall redistribution 0.020 100% 0.154 100% 
 
 United States 2004 Uruguay 2004 
 Gini  Gini  
(a) Gini primary income 0.482   0.542   
(b) Gini disposable income 0.372   0.428   
Overall redistribution (a-b) 0.109   0.114   
 
Partial effects   Share a   Share a 
Sickness benefits  - - - - 
Occupational injury and disease benefits 0.001 1% 0.000 0% 
Disability benefits  0.007 6% - - 
State old-age and survivors benefits 0.037 34% 0.091 73% 
Child/family benefits 0.000 0% 0.004 3% 
Unemployment compensation benefits 0.002 2% 0.002 2% 
Maternity and other family leave benefits - - - - 
Military/veterans/war benefits 0.002 2% - - 
Other social insurance benefits 0.000 0% - - 
Social assistance cash benefits  0.014 13% 0.027 21% 
Near-cash benefits 0.005 5% - - 
Mandatory payroll taxes 0.000 0% - - 
Income taxes 0.041 38% - - 
Other a 0.000  0.011  
Overall redistribution 0.109 100% 0.125 100% 
 
a Including ordering effect. The partial redistributive effect of a specific social transfer will be highest (smallest) 
when computed as the first (last) social program. The partial effects of these transfers in total redistribution 
could be computed in several orders. We consider every specific social transfer as the first program to be added 
to primary income distribution, and every direct tax as the first tax to be subtracted from gross income. In that 
case, the sum of all partial redistributive effects amount (a little) over 100 percent. We rescaled the 
redistributive effects of each program by applying an adjustment factor, which is defined as the overall 
redistribution given by formula (4) (100%) divided by sum of all partial redistributive effects of all programs 
(over 100%), in order to correct for an over-estimated effect. 
 
Source: LIS (2011), and own calculations. 
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Annex 3 Budget Incidence Fiscal Redistribution Dataset – LIS Waves I – VI, 1970-2006 
 
Aim 
Leiden Budget Incidence Fiscal Redistribution Dataset presents the disentanglement of income 
inequality and the redistributive effect of social transfers and taxes in 36 LIS countries for the 
period 1970-2006 (Waves I - Wave VI of LIS). This dataset allow researchers and public policy 
analysts to compare fiscal redistribution across developed countries over the last three decades. 
Research may employ these data in addressing several important research issues. Among the 
most commonly addressed questions in the empirical literature on the welfare state concerns the 
sources of variance across countries and over time in the extent and nature of fiscal 
redistribution. Changes (in the generosity) of welfare states can be linked to (changes in the 
fiscal redistribution). Best-practice among countries can be identified and analyzed in more detail. 
In exploring the causes and effects of welfare state redistribution in the developed world, the 
literature has increasingly moved towards more disaggregated measures of social policy, an 
enterprise in which the Leiden Budget Incidence Fiscal Redistribution Dataset, with its detailed 
data on taxes and a large number of individual social benefits, offers a rich source of information.  
Research could focus on households with very low income as well—those in poverty. The budget 
incidence approach based on LIS data allow researchers to employ all kind of cross-national 
analyses. How well is social expenditure targeted to the poor? Moreover, with LIS data on fiscal 
redistribution research is able to analyze differences in anti-poverty approaches of countries 
(Europe versus the United States) and/or to judge the effectiveness of poverty reduction by taxes 
and transfers across countries. 
The assembled databank of fiscal redistribution can be used by scholars and policy analysts to 
study the effects of different kind of programs on poverty, income adequacy in retirement, and 
the distribution of economic well-being generally.  
 
Origin of the idea 
The original database on Fiscal Redistribution based on LIS date was initiated by Jesuit and 
Mahler in 2004 (LIS Working Paper #392). Leiden Budget Incidence Fiscal Redistribution Dataset 
refines, updates and extent their Fiscal Redistribution approach. LIS data allowed us to 
decompose the trajectory of the Gini coefficient from primary to disposable income inequality in 
several parts: the dataset distinguish 11 different benefits and several income taxes and social 
contributions across countries. 
Jesuit and Mahler divided overall government redistribution only into 3 components: the 
redistributive effects from unemployment benefits, from pensions, and from taxes. They applied 
their empirical exercise for 13 countries with LIS-data around the years 1999/2000. The launch 
of Leiden Budget Incidence Fiscal Redistribution Dataset covers many more benefits and taxes, is 
applied to a much wider range of 36 countries using the most recent LIS data available.  
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 LIS Fiscal Redistribution 
Dataset 
Leiden Budget Incidence Fiscal Redistribution Dataset 
Assembled Jesuit & Mahler Wang & Caminada 
Launch / Year August 2005 -- updated July 
2006 
August 2011 
Last update February 2008 August 2011 
# Countries 13 36 
Countries Australia, Belgium, Canada, 
Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Netherlands, 
Norway, Sweden, 
Switzerland, United Kingdom, 
United States 
 
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Colombia, 
Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Hungary, Ireland, Israel, 
Italy, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, 
Peru, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovak Republic, 
Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, United 
Kingdom, United States, and Uruguay. 
# LIS Waves I, II, III, IV and V I, II, III, IV, V and VI 
Time-series 1979-2002 1979-2006 
# LIS Datasets 59 177 
Redistribution from Unemployment benefits 
Pensions 
Direct taxes 
Sickness benefits (v16) 
Occupational injury and disease benefits (v17) 
Disability benefits (v18) 
State old-age and survivors benefits (v19) 
Child/family benefits (v20) 
Unemployment compensation benefits (v21) 
Maternity and other family leave benefits (v22) 
Military/veterans/war benefits (v23) 
Other social insurance benefits (v24) 
Social assistance cash benefits (v25) 
Near-cash benefits (v26) 
Mandatory payroll taxes (v7+v13) 
Income taxes (v11) 
LIS Working Paper LIS Working Paper #392  LIS Working Paper #567  
Availability http://www.lisdatacenter.org/
resources/other-databases/ 
www.hsz.leidenuniv.nl  
Reference V.A. Mahler and D.K. Jesuit, 
‘Fiscal redistribution in the 
developed countries: new 
insights from the Luxembourg 
Income Study’, Socio-
Economic Review 4 (2006): 
483–511. 
Chen Wang and Koen Caminada, ‘Disentangling income 
inequality and the redistributive effect of social transfers 
and taxes in 36 LIS countries’, Leiden Department of 
Economics Research Memorandum #2011.02.  
 
 
Dataset 
This data set offers a number of measures of fiscal redistribution in the developed countries, 
drawing upon data from 177 Luxembourg Income Study surveys conducted in 36 countries 
between 1967 and 2006. In this dataset we have computed five kinds of results, namely income 
inequality before social transfers and taxes, income inequality after social transfers and taxes, 
the overall redistributive effect, the partial effect of redistribution by several social transfers and 
the partial effect of redistribution by several income taxes (see for a specification below). 
Specifically, we have computed: 
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1) A measure of overall fiscal redistribution, as reflected in the difference between the Gini 
indexes of pre-tax-transfer primary income and post-tax-transfer disposable income. We offer 
measures of both absolute fiscal redistribution (Gini pri - Gini dpi) and relative fiscal 
redistribution ((Gini pri - Gini dpi)/ Gini pri).  
[Table A1 in Excel Spreadsheet] 
 
2) The shares of absolute and relative fiscal redistribution resulting from direct taxes and social 
transfers.  
[Table A2 in Excel Spreadsheet] 
 
3) The average size of social transfers as a proportion of households’ pre-tax income, and a 
summary index of the degree to which transfers are targeted toward low-income groups. Our 
measure ranges from -1.0 (the poorest recipient receives all transfer income) to +1.0 (the 
richest recipient receives all transfer income). 
[Table A3 in Excel Spreadsheet] 
 
4) A measure of the extent of fiscal redistribution that is associated with several taxes and 
transfers (codes refer to LIS Household Income Components List; see Annex A below): 
- Sickness benefits (V16) 
- Occupational injury and disease benefits (v17) 
- Disability benefits (v18) 
- State old-age and survivors benefits (v19) 
- Child/family benefits (v20) 
- Unemployment compensation benefits (v21) 
- Maternity and other family leave benefits (v22) 
- Military/veterans/war benefits (v23) 
- Other social insurance benefits (v24) 
- Social assistance cash benefits (v25) 
- Near-cash benefits (v26) 
- Mandatory payroll taxes (v7+v13) 
- Income taxes (v11) 
[Table A4 in Excel Spreadsheet] 
 
In measuring income, we have employed an equivalency scale that divides household size by the 
square root of the number of household members, weighting households by the number of 
members they include. As to missing data, we have included households which report zero 
primary income (i.e., all of their income is derived from the state) but have excluded households 
that report zero disposable income. We have employed standard LIS top- and bottom-coding 
conventions, top-coding income at 10 times the median of non-equivalized income and bottom-
coding income at 1 percent of equivalized mean income. 
A description of the decomposition method of Gini coefficient is given in sections 3.2 and 3.3. 
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Availability / Questions / Contact 
 
Leiden LIS Budget Incidence Fiscal Redistribution Dataset – LIS Waves I – VI, 1970-2006 is 
posted at the website of Department of Economics homepage at www.hsz.leidenuniv.nl or 
www.economie.leidenuniv.nl. 
 
Any questions about Leiden Budget Incidence Fiscal Redistribution Dataset may be addressed to:  
 
CHEN WANG, Economics Department, Leiden University, PO Box 9520, 2300 RA Leiden, The 
Netherlands. E-mail: c.wang@law.leidenuniv.nl 
 
or  
 
KOEN CAMINADA, Economics Department, Leiden University, PO Box 9520, 2300 RA Leiden, The 
Netherlands. E-mail: c.l.j.caminada@law.leidenuniv.nl 
 Research Memorandum Department of Economics  
 
 
Research Memoranda 
- are available from Department of Economics homepage at : http://www.economie.leidenuniv.nl  
- can be ordered at Leiden University, Department of Economics, P.O. Box 9520, 2300 RA Leiden, The Netherlands 
Phone ++71 527 7756;   E-mail: economie@law.leidenuniv.nl 
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